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gas in the offshore regions.
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1. OVERVIEW OF THE ASSESSMENT
 
This report, consisting of ten volumes, repre­
sents the results of the 
SEASAT Economic Assessment, as
 
completed through August 31, 1975. 
 The individual volumes
 
in this report are:
 
Volume I - Summary and Conclusions 
Volume II 
- The SEASAT System Description and 
Performance 
Volume Ili - Offshore Oil and Natural Gas Industry 
-

Case Study and Generalization
 
Volume IV - Ocean Mining 
- Case Study and Generali­
zation
 
Volume V - Coastal Zones 
 Case Study and Generali­
zation,
 
Volume VI - Arctic Operations 
- Case Study and
 
Generalization
 
Volume VII - Marine Transportation 
- Case Study and
 
Generalization
 
-Volume VIII 
- Ocean Fishing - Case Study and Generali­
zation 
Volume IX - Ports and Harbors 
- Case Study and Gen­
eralization 
Volume X - A Program for the Evaluation of Opera­
tional SEASAT System Costs. 
Each volume is self-contained and fully documents
 
the results in the study area corresponding to the title.
 
Table 1.1 describes the content of each volume to 
aid readers
 
in the selection of material that is 
of specific interest.
 
The SEASAT Economic Assessment began during Fis­
cal Year 1975. The objectives of the preliminary economic
 
assessment, conducted during Fiscal 
Year 1975, were to identi­
fy 
the uses and users of the data that could be produced by
 
an operational SEASAT 
system and to provide preliminary esti­
mates of 
the benefits produced by the applications of this
 
Iab I. COnLLtaitnd Organ[ 
Z d L 
on of the Vi1nal RpoL 
Volume No. 'Attic CoiLoIL 
I Sumimary and Conclusions A summary of benefits 
major findings of 
and costs, and 
the assessment. 
a statement of the 
II The SIASAT System 
Description and Per-
formance 
A discussion of user requirements, and the system concepts 
to satisfy these requirements are presented along with a 
preliminary analysis of the costs of those systems. A 
description of the plan for the SEASAT data utility studies 
and a discussion of the preliminary results of the simula-
Llun exporimUnts conducted with the objective of quanti fying 
the offects of SIASAi' data on numerical forecasting. 
tI offshore Oil aind 
Natural Gas InduIstry-
Case Study and Gner-
aliza Lon 
The rosultb of case studle which investigate the effects of 
forecasL accuracy o. offshore operations in the North Sea, 
the Ce]Lic Sea, and the Gulf of Mexico are reported. A 
methodology for genera] izing the results to other geographic 
regions of offshore oil and natural gas exploration and de­
velopinent is described along with an estimate of the world­
wide benefi ts. 
IV Ocean Mining - Cabe 
SLudy an11d Genera]-
izaLion 
Thi resu its ot a study of the weadther sensiLive features o. 
Lhe near shore and deep water ocean mining industries are 
described. Problems with the evaluation of economic benefits, 
for the deep water ocean mining industry are attributed to 
the relative immaturity and highly proprietary nature of the 
industry. 
1able 1.1 Contcnt and Organization of 
(coilt I antIcI 
the Final Report 
Volume N10. Title Contont 
V Co. Iai Zo.u. - Caavp 
Study and General-
[zat Ion1 
Tile study and generalznLiron deal wilt th1e economic loss 0s 
qtstailied In tie U.S coastal zones for the purpose of 
quantitatively establsiming economic benefits as a celise­(]ienco of improving the predictive quality of destructive 
phenomena In, U.S. coastal rones. Improved prediction of 
hurric0.l landfal] and , iproved experimenta1 knowledge of 
hurricine oeilng are dIiacu id. 
VI Arctic C01"1a ttis - CaseSLuIy an.d Generllzation 'Ie hypothietical devolopment and transportation of Arcticoil and other roso'rces by ice breakini goier tanker to 
the continental East Coast are dJscusf.od. SEASAT data willcontrlibute to a more effective transportation operation
throgh Ilie Arctic ice liy reducing transportation costs a­
d cant.onheroce of reduced transit tlme per voyage. 
VII Marine Transportatton-
Case Study and General-
Izatron 
A discussIon of tile case studios of the potential use of 
SEASAT ocean coaditLion data In the improved routing of dry 
cargo skhja and tankers. Resulting foreCast.s could be 
u iu] In rout Ilg shI ps around storms, theroby reducing 
adverse weather damage, time loss, related operation, costs, 
nid occasional catastrophic losses. 
VIII Ocean 
Study 
ation 
lish tng - Case 
and Generaitz-
Tie potential application of SnASAT d]ata with regard to 
ocean ftsheries is discussed I tilts case study. Tracking
fish popula tiois, Indi rect assistance in forecasting expected
populations and assistance to fishing fleets in avoidlng
costs incurred due td adverse weather through Improved ocean 
conditions forecasts were inivestlqated. 
IX Perts 
St Itdy 
al il 
amid 
liabor 
General 
- Case 
. at Lon 
/'h case study atd gleneraizatiLon quantfy benefits made possible through Improved weather foroecasting resultLing 
iom the inLe( raLion of SF:ASAT data into local wen tier 
forecasts. 'rhe major source of avoildable economic losses 
from i nadequae woeatiter forecasting daLa was shown to be 
dependent on 10ca] preclpitaLion forecasLing. 
A Program for the Bvalu-
ation of Operational 
SEASAl System Costs 
A dinsossion Of 11he SA[iL 2 Program which was developed to
a'.slst in the itvaluatioi of the costs of opnration l SEASA' 
systot ItoelaLJV.e. SAI'IL 2 eniables the assessment of the 
effecL, Of nprtilLonal reqireimts, reliabil tty, and Ume-
ihaisid IUtLl of a I tornatiye apprOaCulins. 
W 
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data.* The preliminary economic assessment identified large
 
potential benefits from the use of SEASAT-produced data in the
 
areas of Arctic operations, marine transportation and offshore
 
oil and natural gas exploration and development.
 
During Fiscal Year 1976, the effort was directed to­
ward the confirmation of the benefit estimates in 
the three
 
previously identified major areas of use of SEASAT data, as
 
well as the estimation of benefits in additional application
 
areas. The confirmation of the benefit estimates in 
the three
 
major areas of application was accomplished by increasing both
 
the extent of user involvement and the depth of each of the
 
studies. Upon completion of this process of estimation, we have
 
concluded that substantial, firm benefits from the use of oper­
ational SEASAT data 
can be obtained in areas that are extensions
 
of current operations such as marine transportation and offshore
 
oil and natural gas exploration and development. Very large
 
potential benefits from the use of SEASAT data are possible in
 
an area of operations that is now in the planning or conceptual
 
stage, namely the transportation of oil, natural gas and other
 
resources by surface ship in the Arctic regions. In this case,
 
the benefits are dependent upon the rate of development of the
 
resources 
that are believed to be in the Arctic regions, and
 
also dependent upon the choice of surface transportation over
 
pipelines as the means of moving these resources to the lower
 
ECON, Inc. SEASAT Economic Assessment, October 1974.
 
latitudes. Our studies have also identified that large
 
potential benefits may be possible from the use of SEASAT
 
data in support of ocean fishing operations. However, in
 
this case, the size of the sustainable yield of the ocean
 
remains an unanswered question; thus, a conservative view­
point concerning the size of the benefit should be adopted
 
until the process of biological replenishment is more
 
completely understood.
 
With the completion of this second year of the
 
SEASAT Economic Assessment, we conclude that the cumulative
 
gross benefits that may be obtained through the use of data
 
from an operational SEASAT system, to provide improved ocean
 
condition and weather forecasts is in the range of $859
 
million to $2,709 million ($1975 at a 10 percent discount
 
rate) from civilian activities. These are gross benefits
 
that are attributable exclusively to the use of SEASAT data
 
products and do not include potential benefits from other
 
possible sources of weather and ocean forecasting that may
 
occur in the same period of time. The economic benefits
 
to U.S. military activities from an operational SEASAT sys­
tem are not included in these estimates. A separate study
 
of U.S. Navy applications has been conducted under the
 
sponsorship of the Navy Environmental Remote Sensing Coor­
dinating and Advisory Committee. The purpose of this Navy
 
study was to determine the stringency of satellite oceano­
graphic measurements necessary to achieve improvements in
 
6 
military mission effectiveness in areas where benefits are
 
known to exist.* It is currently planned that the, Navy
 
will use SEASAT-A data to quantify benefits in military
 
applications areas. A one-time military benefit of approx­
imately $30 million will be obtained by SEASAT-A, by pro­
viding a measurement capability in support of the Depart­
ment of Defense Mapping, Charting and Geodesy Program.
 
Preliminary estimates have been made of the costs
 
of an operational SEASAT program that would be capable of
 
producing the data needed to obtain these benefits. The
 
hypothetical operational program used to model the costs of
 
an operational SEASAT system includes SEASAT-A, followed by
 
a number of developmental and operational demonstration
 
flights, with full operational capability commencing in
 
1985. The cost of the operational SEASAT system through
 
2000 is estimated to be about $753 million ($1975, 0 per­
cent discount rate) which is the equivalent of $272 million
 
($1975) at a 10 percent discount rate. It should be noted
 
that this cost does not include the costs of the program's
 
unique ground data handling equipment needed to process,
 
disseminate or utilize the information produced from SEASAT
 
data. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 illustrate the net .cumulative
 
SEASAT exclusive benefit stream (benefits less costs) as a
 
Navy Remote Sensing Coordinating and Advisory
 
Committee. "Specifications of Stringency of Satellite
 
Oceanographic Measurements for Improvement of Navy
 
Mission Effectiveness." (Draft Report.) May 1975.
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function of the discount rate.
 
This volume presents case studies and their
 
generalization concerning the economic benefits of im­
proved ocean condition, weather and ice forecasts to the
 
exploration, development and production of oil and gas
 
in offshore regions.
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2. 	 INTRODUCTION TO THE OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS
 
INDUSTRY CASE STUDY AND GENERALIZATION
 
The Offshore Oil and Gas Industry explores, prospects
 
and mines gas and oil deposits below the sea. In so doing it
 
pursues a logical sequence of activities, involving specialized
 
equipment and operations, in the context of the sea. The
 
activities require various forms of drilling into the subsea
 
earth's surface from vessels designed to allow the necessary
 
drilling precision, to discover, delineate and develop oil and
 
gas fields so that oil and gas outputs can be produced.
 
Equipment must therefore function effectively in the sea and
 
operations must be as economically efficient as the sea
 
environment will permit, in an attempt to minimize the costs of
 
oil 	and gas extraction.
 
SEASAT will be designed and operated to remotely collect
 
global data, without weather constraint, which will serve to
 
improve knowledge, predictive and otherwise, of meteorological
 
and oceanographic conditions at a given place and time for
 
certain durations.
 
It is assumed that the activities of the offshore oil
 
and 	gas industry are subject to influences of the environment
 
which produce avoidable economic losses. This implies that with
 
sufficient forewarning these particular economic losses could be
 
reduced or eliminated, provided that alternative forms of the
 
activities can be planned for and undertaken. SEASAT, in its
 
ii
 
operational form, will provide data from which forewarning can
 
be made available in a timely and appropriate manner to those
 
involved in offshore oil and gas operations. If it is assumed
 
that alternate forms of activities will occur within these
 
operations then economic savings will result.
 
The objectives of this case study and its generalization
 
are to quantitatively establish those economic benefits to the
 
offshore oil and gas activities of production platform erection,
 
pipelaying and exploratory drilling, which will result from the
 
use of data provided by an operational SEASAT system. Since the
 
operational SEASAT system will be in orbit after 1985 it is
 
necessary to define the quantities of offshore oil and gas
 
activity beyond 1985.
 
The procedure used in this study is to quantify economic
 
savings or benefits derived in case studies of specific offshore
 
oil and gas operations. These are then extended or generalized
 
to the worldwide operations of the offshore oil and gas indus­
try. The case studies have treated two separate activities,
 
production platform erection and pipelaying and exploratory
 
drilling. Benefits in the former case study were derived from
 
an actual operation in the southern North Sea supplemented by
 
an actual operation in the Gulf of Mexico. The latter case
 
study was developed from an actual operation in the Celtic
 
Sea. The generalization is developed from a modeling of world­
wide offshore oil and gas production from 1985 to 2000, the
 
time horizon for the economic assessment.
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The reduction of economic loss (or benefits derived)
 
result from a reduction of avoidable labor costs and from the
 
reduction of accidents both in production platform erection and
 
exploratory drilling. The labor associated benefits arise from
 
a requirement to contract ahead of time in order to assure that
 
labor will be available to perform production or pipelaying
 
tasks. If, when the time for actual performance of these tasks
 
arrives, the weather or sea conditions preclude the work
 
performance, the labor must still be paid, in effect for no
 
work. Such costs could be avoided if the weather and sea
 
conditions expected at the work site could be known with
 
at least 48 hours ahead. Because such predictions
certainty for 

will involve some uncertainty, these costs cannot be completely
 
eliminated, only reduced. It is difficult to estimate
 
conservatively and to strongly substantiate economic benefits
 
that are a consequence of operational accidents that may occur
 
in the future. The basic difficulty-lies with accepting the
 
conviction that today's accidents will continue and that
 
procedures will not be introduced which will considerably
 
diminish the economic losses sustained. It is however necessary
 
to bear in mind that the accidents of interest are those that
 
could be avoided if the weather and sea conditions that give
 
rise to them could be predicted ahead of time. That is, it is
 
implied that the accidents of interest are, in reality, those
 
associated with operational activities that must be performed
 
and yet which are known to be susceptible to inclement weather
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and sea conditions of certain inclement magnitudes. Thus the
 
occurrence of the accident is a function of the expected ocean
 
conditions to the extent that it would be possible to
 
reschedule the vulnerable activities to periods of less
 
inclement conditions. Knowledge that such inclement conditions
 
will occur will presumably reduce the possibility of these
 
accidents. Today drilling rig operators carefully guard
 
knowledge of their drilling locations, the prevailing weather
 
at these locations, and the times when drilling will 
occur.
 
Some operators completely ignore weather change predictions;
 
others attempt to directly incorporate into their on-site
 
operations updated facsimile weather charts.* 
 In view of the
 
secrecy that surrounds these operations it may be difficult to
 
determine what data the operators actually need and to imple­
ment an accident avoidance system.
 
Avoidable accidents that are weather and sea condition
 
related do occur in the offshore oil industry. Some of these
 
accidents are quite spectacular in their far-reaching effect on
 
operation downtime. This is a result of equipment damage or
 
loss and the current difficultyof repair and replacement,
 
because of many shortages in the industry. For example, an
 
accident costing 
the operator $5.4 million or more was described
 
as follows:
 
Offshore, February 1975, p. 76.
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An operator of a semisubmersible, paying no
 
heed to an approaching storm, loosened an anchor
 
chain to perform an operation. Another chain was
 
dragging. The storm blew in, wrapping one of the
 
anchor chains around the riser and knocking over
 
the BOP stack. As a result, six months of
 
operating time, at more than $30,000 per day, 
were 
lost. * 
The blow off preventer (BOP) is a substantial piece of
 
equipment weighing perhaps 100 tons, situated 
over the well
 
head at sea bottom. The operation of the BOP is automatically
 
controlled to 
prevent pollution when drilling operations must
 
be shut down under emergency conditions.
 
In those regions of the world where weather and sea
 
conditions are generally inhospitable yet where oil and gas
 
deposits are apparent, exploration and development capital
 
requirements are such that the pressure to 
move rapidly into
 
production and recover capital appears-to warrant many risks.
 
Political pressure is also a significant force in many regions
 
and safety is not always a cardinal rule.
 
It is however becoming evident that the influence of
 
weather and sea condit'ions on the offshore oil and gas
 
industry's costs is initiating integrated regional weather
 
studies and sea bottom studies. One such region is the Indian
 
Ocean. The objectives are to improve design or selection of
 
Offshore, February 1975, p. 100.
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the equipment most suited to the characteristics of the
 
operating environment. Additionally weather and sea condition
 
studies are important to the choice of reasonable risk factors
 
for rig and equipment design by which cost savings result be­
cause of a clearer understanding of the expected coincidence of
 
environmental phenomena (wave height, wind, current, etc.). It
 
is also clear that weather and sea condition forecasting in the
 
offshore regions is not available from most weather forecasting
 
institutions. These institutions concentrate on forecasting
 
over land where their major responsibility, as governmental
 
services, lies. It is not clear what weather/sea condition
 
data will be most beneficial to operators in different regions
 
of the world, nor what quality of data is required. Some
 
operations, as in the northern North Sea, are most concerned
 
about sudden storms from the North West over the Shetland
 
Islands. In the Indian Ocean it is the sea swells that have a
 
great influence along with the great variation in sea bottom
 
conditions. It seems indisputable that all satellite weather
 
and sea condition data will be of great service to local
 
forecasting organizations operating in the world's regions
 
where offshore oil and gas prospecting will be active. A
 
rigorous determination of the weather and sea condition
 
forecasting dependence of offshore oil and gas activities
 
throughout the world would perhaps enable NASA to attempt a
 
specific satellite design optimized for offshore industry.
 
16 
Subsequent sections of this chapter summarize the
 
results of the case studies, the modeling of their
 
generalization and the estimation of generalized benefits.
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3. 	 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
 
3.1 Summary
 
Case studies have been performed on the offshore oil
 
and gas industry's operations of oil production platform erec­
tion, pipelaying and exploratory drilling to determine the
 
influence that weather and 
sea condition prediction could have
 
on the reduction of avoidable economic losses within these
 
operations.
 
Each case study was developed from operational data
 
obtained from the industry. Oil production and pipelaying data
 
came from experience in the southern North Sea prior to 1971 and
 
from the Gulf of Mexico off the Louisiana coast in 1972.
 
Exploratory drilling data 
came from the experience of a drill
 
ship in the Celtic Sea from 1970 to 1974.
 
The case studies identify avoidable economic losses or
 
benefits associated with the operations as follows:
 
1. 	 $0.19 million for each production platform
 
installed
 
2. 	 $0.06 million for each mile of pipe laid and
 
trenched
 
3. 	 $0.41 million for each jackup drill rig drilling
 
year
 
4. 	 $0.54 million for each drillship drilling year
 
5. 	 $0.81 million for each semisubmersible drilling
 
year.
 
The benefits for production platforms and pipelaying
 
arise from reduced contractual costs for nonproductive labor
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and from the avoidance of accidents. The benefits require
 
reliable weather and sea condition forecast with a prediction
 
interval of at least 48 hours. The benefits to exploratory
 
drilling arise from the avoidance of accidents during operation
 
and require a highly precise weather and sea state forecast
 
with a maximum prediction interval of 24 hours, since this is
 
the maximum time required to close down exploratory drilling
 
operations.
 
Accidents are defined in this context as operational
 
activities that must be performed but whose efficiency is
 
dependent on weather and sea conditions. If the predicted
 
weather and sea conditions are such that these activities would
 
be jeopardized it is presumed that they would be postponed and
 
accidents would not occur.
 
The case study benefits are considered to be realizable
 
assuming the offshore oil industry receives and acts effectively
 
on the weather and sea condition prediction data supplied
 
utilizing data from the operational SEASAT and other sources.
 
A case study generalization was then performed. The
 
generalization resulted from a simple model which establishes
 
the exploratory drill rig population for the time interval
 
1975-2000, the expected success of worldwide exploratory
 
drilling in generating oil production, the number of production
 
platforms and the amount of associated pipe that must be laid.
 
The drill rig fleet is assumed to have an ideal composition of
 
48 percent jackups, 27 percent drillships and 25 percent semi­
19
 
submersibles which is matched reasonably to the bathymetric,
 
sea bottom and expected weather and sea conditions in the
 
future world offshore oil exploration and production regions.
 
The model projects an incremental offshore oil
 
production by 1985 (with respect to a 1975 base) of 15.54
 
million barrels of oil per day and a total offshore produc­
tion of 25.54 million barrels of oil per day or about 33 per­
cent of the.projected world total oil production. By 2000,
 
the incremental offshore production will be 52.6 million
 
barrels of oil per day for a total oil production of 78.1
 
million barrels of oil per day or about 60 percent of the
 
then projected world total oil production. The model also
 
projects a rig fleet that will grow from 300 vessels in 1975
 
to 700 vessels in 1985 which will then decline as a result
 
of concentration on production at the rate of 10 per annum
 
due to vessel retirements and losses at sea.
 
The production between 1985 and 2000 will require
 
the fabrication and installation of 526 production platforms
 
each producing 0.1 million barrels of oil per day. To sus­
tain this production, between 65,940 and 89,893 miles of pipe
 
must be laid. Between 1975 and 2000 the industry capital re­
quirements are estimated to be $560 billion. To achieve
 
these rates of production and to maintain a 30:1 ratio be­
tween reserves and production, approximately 855 billion
 
barrels of oil must be discovered or about 61 percent of the
 
currently estimated undiscovered offshore oil. This amount
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is 	about 8.6 times the amount discovered in the last 25 years.
 
Based on these projections for each year between
 
1985 and 2000, the following parameters pertinent to global
 
offshore and gas are determined:
 
1. 	the average number of production
 
platforms brought into operation
 
per annum each producing
 
100,boo barrels per day 35
 
2. 	the average amount of pipe to be
 
laid and trenched per annum 5,194 miles
 
3. 	the average size of the exploratory
 
drilling rig fleet
 
jackups 300; drillships 169;
 
semisubmersibles 156 
 625
 
(Daily operating costs $30,000, $40,000
 
and $60,000).
 
Using these estimated parameters and the benefit
 
quantitatives of the case studies, the unadjusted, global annual
 
benefit to offshore oil and gas is estimated to be $658 million.
 
This annual estimated benefit would be valid if all
 
the offshore oil and gas activity envisaged took place in the
 
southern North Sea. It is clear that this will not be the case
 
but it is extremely difficult to forecast which regions of the
 
world will be the significant offshore oil and gas producers
 
in 	1985-2000.
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A judgmental distribution for offshore oil region pro­
duction has been made for 1985 and with each producing region
 
a weather factor has been assigned relative to the weather in
 
the southern North Sea. With this judgmental allocation a
 
weather weighting multiplier for 1985 of 0.579 is derived. This
 
derivation for 1985 allocates a large weight to the northern
 
North Sea because the actions of the governments of the United
 
Kingdom'and Norway appear to be fully in accord with a policy
 
of achieving their desired productions in 1985. Beyond 1985,
 
however, it seems today that governmental policy in the north­
ern North Sea will seek to control the rate of the depletion
 
of the existing oil and gas. Consequently, during 1985 to 2000
 
a weather weighting multiplier ranging from 0.359 to 0.579 is
 
judgmentally thought to be appropriate.
 
Using these factors and applying them to the unadjusted
 
global annual benefit, the global annual regional weather
 
adjusted benefit will lie between $236 million and $381 million.
 
This benefit range is the result of applying all forms and
 
sources of weather and sea condition forecasting data to the
 
operating problems of the offshore oil and gas industry.
 
In the case study relating to coastal zones, a judgmen­
tal evaluation of SEASAT's exclusive contribution to potential
 
benefits was set at 30 percent* This is based on the data an
 
Econ, Inc. SEASAT Economic Assessment, Volume V, Coastal
 
Zones - Case Study and Generalization, 1975.
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operational SEASAT is expected to supply and its relevance
 
to the models required for a wide variety of weather and sea
 
condition predictions.
 
Consequently it is suggested that an annual benefit
 
exclusive to SEASAT from offshore oil and gas activity during
 
1985-2000 will rangefrom $71 million to $114 million. This
 
is thought to be a most likely benefit range.
 
This benefit range, integrated over the years 1985-2000
 
but discounted to the beginning of 1975 is shown below as a
 
function of discount rate.
 
Annual discount rate 0% 5% 10% 15%
 
SEASAT exclusive most
 
likely benefit range 1136-1824 476-765 214-344 104-168
 
($ million, 1975)
 
Because the global offshore oil and gas industry is in
 
a volatile stage of development and because it is very diffi­
cult to foresee what returns on investment may result from the
 
various governmental developing policies with respect to explor­
ation and production, the future price of oil and the success of
 
specific applications of technology, a benefit uncertainty range
 
has been developed. This uncertainty range attempts to span all
 
sources of industry estimates for the size of the exploratory
 
drilling rig fleet. Whereas the model projected a-rig fleet of
 
700 by 1985, the uncertainty range would project from 300 to
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1000 as the rig fleet size by 1985. The lower bound maintains
 
the current rig fleet population. With these rig fleets, the
 
lower bound leads to an annual benefit exclusive to SEASAT
 
ranging from $29 million to $47 million and the upper bound to
 
a range from $103 million to $166 million. Hence the annual
 
benefit range exclusive to SEASAT from the oil and gas industry
 
including uncertainty is estimated to be from $29 million to
 
$166 million.
 
The discounted integrated benefit range with uncertainty
 
exclusive to SEASAT as a function of discount rate, is shown
 
below
 
Annual discount rate 0% 5% 10% 15%
 
SEASAT exclusive benefit
 
range, with uncertainty 464-2656 195-1113 87-501 43-244
 
($ millions, 1975)
 
An independent study is presented, performed by the
 
Canada Centre for Remote Sensing, which deals exclusively with
 
future offshore and coastal oil production from the Canadian
 
Arctic. Benefits are estimated from this regional study for
 
the time period 1981-1990. If only benefits after 1985 are
 
considered, then the time integrated undiscounted benefits of
 
this independent study agree reasonably well with the benefits
 
associated with this region as determined from the model for
 
generalization, developed from the case studies.
 
3.2 
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Conslusions
 
The case study and its generalization reported
 
in reference 1 estimated annual benefits, in 1974 dollars,
 
ranging from 585.6 million to $214 million, to offshore
 
oil and gas production platform erection and pipelaying.
 
These benefits when adjusted by a factor of 1.1 to convert
 
to 1975 dollars range from $94 million to $235 million,
 
per annum from 1985 to 2000.
 
This current case study and its generalization
 
estimates annual benefits from 1985-2000 of $97 million to
 
$553 million for the activities of oil production platform
 
erection, pipelaying and exploratory drilling. By assess­
ing the industry's apparent intentions as reported in the
 
trade literature during 1974'1975 the most likely benefit
 
range is estimated to be from $236 million to $381 million
 
annually.
 
Both benefit estimates are corrected for global
 
weather and sea state regional influences relative to the
 
southern North Sea and the current study employs an uncer­
tainty factor associated with the size of the world's ex­
ploratory drilling rig fleet in 1985. The previous study
 
only employed an extrapolation of global offshore oil pro­
duction.
 
Both studies tend to agreement at the low end of
 
the benefits, approximately $100 million per annum. Such a
 
benefit results from the application of all data to the .
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required simultaneous and concurrent prediction of global
 
weather and sea conditions.
 
It is estimated that approximately 30 percent of
 
this benefit or almost $33 million annually results exclu­
sively from SEASAT's data application to the modeling re­
quired for prediction of weather and sea conditions, glo­
bally.
 
An annual benefit exclusive to SEASAT of $33 mil­
lion per annum is concluded to be quite firm, from the off­
shore oil and gas industry during 1985-2000 provided that
 
the data are disseminated and acted upon.
 
The derivation of benefits in both studies has
 
been approached always with a conservative point of view.
 
Yet the benefits must always evolve from the current forms
 
of operations in the offshore oil and gas industry. The
 
benefits can only be realized with perfect prediction of
 
weather and sea conditions, if provision is made within
 
these operations for alternative or contingent actions.
 
It is clear that today the oil companies and their
 
contracted operators are coming to grips with the financial
 
risks involved in offshore oil and gas exploration, parti­
cularly in those regions where the sea is inhospitable, in­
cluding regions where operations must proceed through ice.
 
With renewed financial evaluations, operational forms change
 
continually as equipments and procedures move to a more
 
efficient matching to the demands of the environment. Thus,
 
technology and the search for operational economic viability
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appear to move toward making the case study data obsolete
 
to some degree.
 
For example, future production techniques tend
 
to reduce the need for production platforms by using under­
sea, subsea or sea bottom well completions. This produc­
tion form appears to be suitable for deep water production,
 
is advantageous where oil-bearing geological formations or
 
structures are difficult of access and promises an earlier
 
cash flow return from production. Yet the technology and
 
its adaptation to various production requirements is not
 
yet established but its advent will reduce benefits estab­
lished for production platforms. It is expected that, as
 
the new technique is applied to production, avoidable eco­
nomic losses will still occur which can be avoided by im­
proved weather and sea-state prediction. It is reasonable,
 
however, to expect that the requirements for prediction
 
for subsea completions Will be different from those for
 
production platforms. In this study, the benefits to pro­
duction platforms are estimated to be only about 1 percent
 
of the total unadjusted benefit. Thus, a substantial
 
change in this area would have only a small effect upon
 
the benefits. It is difficult to forecast what contribu­
tion to benefits might arise from the technology of subsea
 
completion. It is conjectured that this example will be
 
typical of new technology introduced into oil and gas explor­
ation and exploitation. Benefits will not disappear; they
 
will be modified as will the prediction requirements of
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weather and sea conditions.
 
Drilling and pipelaying 
are and will be gundamental
 
to the offshore oil and gas industry. The character of pipe­
laying.and the 
amount of pipe required may change appreciably
 
with subsea completions, but again, predictions of these
 
changes are not possible. Pipelaying could also be consider­
ably influenced by various proposed forms of storage 
at sea
 
with off-loading into tankers, but trends
no to these activ­
ities seem to be established 
so that the influence can be
 
assessed.
 
The benefits derived in 
these studies are reasonable
 
and conservative. 
 However, it is necessary to recognize that
 
the case study data 
from which the benefits are developed may
 
be only appropriate to earlier technology. 
Newer technology
 
will, it is 
expected, still offer opportunities to realize
 
benefits from improved sea 
condition and weather forecasting
 
in the new 
forms that offshore oil and gas operations may take.
 
To take advantaae of the conditions which will permit the
 
benefits to be realized, attention will have 
to be paid to
 
the shifts in prediction of the pertinent 
sea condition and
 
weather phenomena as 
new technology is introduced.
 
4.1 
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4. 	 REVISIONS TO AN EARLIER CASE STUDY OF OIL
 
PRODUCTION IN THE SOUTHERN NORTH SEA
 
A case study performed during 1974 investigated the
 
economic losses resulting from unexpected weather conditions
 
in the southern North Sea suffered by offshore oil production
 
operations.*
 
The losses, derived from an actual operating log
 
prior to 1971, were a 
result of accidents and nonproductive
 
labor costs in erecting production pla-tforms and laying and
 
trenching 	production pipelines.
 
Benefits were 
assumed to result from accident a­
voidance and from reassignment of labor when adverse weather
 
is predictable at 
least 48 hours in advance.
 
The case study benefit revisions for the North Sea
 
are a consequence of increased operating 
costs and of an ad­
justment of the percentage of these costs that should be al­
located to labor. 
 These changes resulted from the current
 
case study investigation of similar operations in the Gulf
 
of Mexico 	and are thought to be more representative.
 
Pipelaying Operations in the Gulf of Mexico
 
Data for the case study of these operations came
 
from a pipeline contractor's progress reports from an 18­
month project. The progress reports are summarized in Ap­
pendices C and D.
 
Econ, Inc. SEASAT Economic Assessment, October 1974,
 
p. 8-7 et 	seq.
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A typica.l pipelaying operation involves equipment
 
such as:
 
1 
 pipelaying barge
 
6 
 tugs
 
2 
 crewboats
 
1 supply boat
 
1 dredging barge
 
Representative daily charges 
(2 shifts) for this equipment are
 
given in Table 4.1 during 1974. The total charge for this
 
operation, including all forms of support, is estimated to be
 
$100,000 per day. The crew of the pipelaying barge varied in
 
size according to the work being performed. On a typical day
 
of pipelaying, the following personnel were charged for each
 
shift:
 
1 superintendent
 
1 barge captain
 
2 contractor representatives
 
5 inspectors
 
6 x-ray technicians
 
2 divers
 
2 diver tenders
 
2 
 tally men
 
20 welders
 
12 welder helpers
 
2 
 welder foremen
 
15 general laborers
 
1 
 medic (presumed 24-hour coverage)
 
Table 4.1 	 Representative Offshore Construction Charges During 1974 in the
 
Gulf of Mexico
 
Unit Hourly Rate 24 Hour Charge 
1 Pipelaying barge 350' x 71 ' x 22.5' w/crew $ 1,800.00 $ 43,200.00 
2
1 Dredge/work barge 250' x 60' x 16' w/crew 925.00 22,200.0,0
 
6 1500 hp tug w/crew 
 70.00 10,080.00
 
2 84' crew boat 
 45.00 2,160.00
 
1 150' work/supply boat 58.00 1,392.00
 
1 150' x 40' offshore certified barge (supply) 10.00 	 240.00
 
( 
Superintendent 
 28.20 676.80
 
3
1 Welder, pipeline (includes $1.75/hr offshore
 
charge) 
 23.45 	 562.80
 
1 	 Welder helper (includes $1.75/hr offshore
 
charge) 9.95 
 238.80 
Typical labor charge rate offshore is $14.00 - $18.00 $336 - $432. 
1Has quarters for 172 men
 
2Has quarters for 61 men
 
3Normal 
shift for hourly workers is 12 hours
 
Note: Estimated day rate for typical operation, based on catalog rates, is $100,OQO.
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For a full 24 hours of operation, i.e., two 12-hour shifts, the
 
pipelaying operation requires 120 men.
 
Three other typical operations were charged for, as shown
 
in Table 4.2, requiring in some cases personnel in standby status.
 
For this data it is concluded that a minimum of 37 personnel are
 
required for the operation in addition to support personnel and
 
crews charged with their equipment.
 
Consequently, it is deduced that approximately
 
80 personnel could be appropriately reassigned to productive
 
tasks if sufficient notice was available of the arrival of
 
weather sufficiently inclement to interrupt completely the
 
pipelaying operation.
 
Reassignment would then apply that pipelaying
 
operations would be impossible for 12 hours per day at least,
 
so that prediction would have to include an anticipated dur­
ation of the inclemency.
 
Assuming an average personnel hourly rate of $16.00,
 
the saving would then be 80 x 16 x 12 = $15,360.
 
Table 4.2 Personnel Charges in the Gulf of Mexico
 
Number of Personnel
 
Personnel Hours Charqes on Standby Work Performed
 
120 12 0 Pipelayinq; good weather
 
55 12 40 Installing riser; good weather
 
37 12 63 None; waiting on weather
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If therefore, the 
sea condition prediction charac­
teristics are appropriate, the minimum labor saving possibility
 
is about 	15 percent of the operation daily cost.
 
No-explicit data are available 
to substantiate differ­
ent personnel requirements in the North Sea. 
 It is therefore
 
concluded that a 
15 percent allocation to labor is 
more reason­
able than the 25 percent allocation used in the previous 
case
 
study.*
 
For the pipelaying operation as a whole using 120 per­
sonnel, the 
daily labor charge is about $23,000 and the daily
 
equipment charge is therefore about $77,000. 
"This compares
 
reasonably with $79,000 from Table 
4.1 by direct addition for
 
representative equipment charges.
 
The North Sea pipelaying equipment is considered to be
 
more expensive to purchase than that for the Gulf of Mexico.
 
The North Sea equipment daily charge is 
therefore increased by
 
approximately 21 percent to 
$93,500. The daily labor rate in
 
the North Sea is assumed to be equal to 
that in the Gulf of
 
Mexico, approximately $23,000 per day. 
 Thus, the total daily
 
operating cost.
 
The revised findings of the previous case study are
 
shown in Table 4.3 - the 
cost saving being reduced from
 
$3,112,000 to $2,644,000, a reduction by about 15 percent.
 
ECON, Inc. SEASAT Economic Assessment, 74-2001-11,
 
Contract No. NASW-2558, October 1974, 
p. 8-7 et. seq.
 
Offshore, February 1975, p. 
117. Quotes on daily rate
 
for maintenancemen as 
$250 per day or about $21 per hour,
 
a rate considerably higher than shown in Table 
3.1.
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Table 4.3 Summary of Revised Case Study Cost Savings
 
Maximum Operational Cost Savings
 
Per Annum from Nonproductive
 
Operating Costs $ 2,644,040 (1974 $)
 
Number of Production Platforms 
 3
 
Miles of Pipeline Laid 38
 
Number of Operating Calendar Days
 
Per Annum 
 272
 
Working Day Operating Costs
 
Labor $23,000 per diem
 
Equipment $93,500 per diem $ 116,500
 
Weather Day Operating Costs
 
(Equipment plus minimum
 
crews) $ 93,500
 
Operation Pipelaying Derrick
 
Incident Accident Barge Barge
 
Incident Occurrence
 
No. Operating.Days 11 64 22
 
Daily Cost ($) 105,000 15,360 23,000
 
Incident Cost
 
Savings per annum ($) 1,155,000 983,040 506,000
 
Assumption: i) SEASAT operational capability available (1985)
 
ii) Operating incident data prior to 1971
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The case study benefits of $2.644 million resulted
 
from the emplacement of three production platforms and the
 
laying and entrenchment of 
38 miles of pipe to transport the
 
oil produced.
 
Oil production from the North Sea is 
expected to
 
grow between 
now and 1985, when SEASAT will become operational.
 
It was estimated during the previous 
case study that
 
a representative annual incremental production would require 
an
 
increment of seven platforms together with the laying of an
 
incremental 250 miles of pipe.
 
For such an annual new production requirement the re­
vised data from the Gulf of Mexico operations reduces this in­
cremental annual benefit from $18.6 million to 
$15.9 million,
 
a reduction of about 15 percent, 
as shown in Table 4.4.
 
Benefits 
A and B (Table 4.4) are considered to be
 
benefits to the operations of pipelaying and trenching, whose
 
total is about $14.6 million. Since this benefit arises from
 
laying and trenching of 250 miles of 
pipe, the benefit per
 
mile of pipe is $0.06 million. Benefit C is a benefit to the
 
erection of seven platforms. Thus, the benefit per platform
 
is estimated to $(1.36/7) million or $0.19 million.
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Table 4.4 	 Revised North Sea 1979-1985 Oil Production
 
Cost Savings
 
A. Accident Avoidance
 
Projected Weather Related
 
Accident Avoidance Ratio A%
 
Number of Pipelaying Barges
 
(50 miles of pipe each) 5
 
Length of Work 365 days
 
Daily Savings of Avoided Accidents
 
(100% equipment costs + $ 93,500
 
50% labor costs) + 11,500
 
$ 105,000
Savings
Potential 

0.04 x 5 x 	365 x 105,000 $ 7,980,000
 
B. Pipelaying Labor Charge Savings
 
Projected Weather Downtime
 
Labor Charge Savings Ratio 23.5%
 
Number of Pipelaying Barges 5
 
Length of Work 365 days
 
Daily Savings on Labor Charges $ 15,360
 
Potential Savings = 
0.235 x 5 x 365 x $15,360 	 $ 6,587,520
 
C. Derrick Barge Labor Charge Savings
 
Projected Weather Downtime
 
Labor Charge Savings Ratio 42.3%
 
Number of Barges Required
 
per Platform Erection 2
 
Number of Platforms Constructed/Yr. 7
 
Number of Days Committed to Task 10
 
Daily Savings on Labor Charges $ 23,000
 
Potential Savings = 
0.423 x 2 x 7 x 10 x $23,000 = $ 1,362,060 
Total Potential Savings = A + B + C = $15,929,580 (1974$)
 
Note: 	 Number of production platforms 7
 
Miles of pipe to be laid 250
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5. EXPLORATORY DRILLING CASE STUDY - CELTIC SEA
 
Exploratory drilling or "wild catting" is performed
 
by drilling rigs described as jackup rigs, drillships or semi­
submersibles. Jackup rigs work most efficiently in shallow
 
water; the drillships can work in deep water and are dynam­
ically positioned; the semisubmersibles are operationally
 
capable in very rough sea conditions such as those in the
 
North Sea.
 
Because positioning for drilling tends to take days
 
to establish, once. established, the drilling rigs seek to stay
 
on station, shutting down operations only when it is no longer
 
possible to drill. In inclement weather resupply by supply
 
boats may be impossible, whale drilling could actually con­
tinue.
 
During drilling activity, accidents occur which
 
are weather related and which, in the opinion of operating
 
personnel, could be avoided. If appropriate forecasting was
 
available and the information employed, ship downtime that
 
results could be avoided.
 
The accidents identified in this case study came
 
from the progress charts relating to the drilling of nine
 
wells in the Celtic Sea by a single vessel during 1970-1974
 
through a total of 1,170 days.
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5.1 	 The Case Study Data
 
By examination of progress charts, reported in
 
Appendix A and from discussions (see Appendix B, E and F)
 
with the sponsoring company's supervisor, accidents result­
ing in significant delays (Table 5.2) were identified. Table
 
5.1 does not include all accidents, only those resulting in
 
a significant operating delay. One major delay was 
caused
 
by a control panel fire and was unrelated to weather. Of
 
approximately 1,170 total operating days over a 
five-year
 
period, 87 days (or 7.4 percent) were lost to weather re­
lated accidents.
 
Experience over the years is summarized in Table
 
5.2. The average time spent waiting on weather was over 20
 
percent. When the weather delay time is tabulated by month,
 
a pattern emerges, namely, a low average percentage during
 
the summer (7 percent) and a high percentage during the
 
winter (42 and 43 percent respectively for December and
 
January). There is considerable variation throughout the
 
year. The third highest delay (52 percent) occurred in May;
 
the two previous Mays had no 
weather delays. The accidents
 
are not distributed equally around the calendar but 
are con­
centrated in the relatively good months. Because of the
 
relatively small sample, 
it may only be conjectured that this
 
distribution is 
related to a combination of (1) expectations
 
that the weather will be good and so risks are taken, and (2)
 
when the ship is closed down for bad weather, fewer delaying
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Table 5.1 	 Accident Caused Delays for Nine Wells. in the
 
Celtic Sea Drilled with a Drillship during
 
1970-1974 1,170 Total Days
 
16 Aug 70 35 days 	 With a storm forecast for midnight,
 
the crew was preparing to close down.
 
The storm arrived early and had
 
associated with its 3 anomalous waves
 
reportedly 60-feet high and quartering
 
(45 degrees off bow or stern). The
 
riser was dropped on the bottom.
 
27 Sep 70 12 days 	 With a weather warning, the riser was
 
still bent before it could be
 
retrieved.
 
11 Jun 71 10 days 	 The stack was dropped. A manufacturing
 
defect was the proximate cause; it was
 
associated with bad weather. A man was
 
killed and a law suit filed.
 
15 Jul 71 10 days 	 Control Panel Fire. The fire was NOT
 
associated with weather problems.
 
30 Mar 72 12 days 	 Anchor chain broken; resulting shift
 
caused damage to equipment.
 
11 Apr 72 15 days 	 Two anchor chains broken; the damage to
 
equipment in the well was so severe
 
that it was abandoned.
 
15 Feb 72 3 days 	 Repairs to anchor chains.
 
Of approximately 1,170 	total operating days over a five­
year period, 87 days (or 7.4 percent) were lost to weather
 
related accidents.
 
Table 5.2 	 Exploratory Drilling Vessel - Celtic Sea; Waiting on WeatheLr Time -

Monthly Percentages; Weather related Accidents are Indicated by "AM
 
Jan Feb liar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct tNov Dec 
w---All llA 
1970 00K1 

0% 4 0% 7.6k 30.9% 11.6% 35.8% 14.8% 
-	 39 days AF 
197 	 Ln welt 11,900 f welt 6500' No 
dry dock 0% 29% Record 
A A r1
 
-
CO F-<9well 2800 
 j
well 7100>- No 	 1 well 1.900
 
1972 Record 31% 31% 27% 52% 10% 1% Record 127 28% 70%
 
1/2 month
 
A 1 No 
1973 22% 15.j Record
 
194 	 1well 3500]fjj* ~< well 9500 37% 2--7%[ well 6500] 
Monthly Averages 43% 27% 22% 27% 17% 7% 7% 7% 23% 20% 34% 42% 
Number of Months 2 3 2 1 3 4 4 3 3 4 3 2
 
Average of Monthly Averages 23%
 
Average over all Months 20%
 
J,
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accidents can happen. It should be noted that some of the
 
accidents were caused by the onset of predicted bad weather
 
before the ship was prepared.
 
Even if weather reports were significantly more
 
reliable, not all accidents would be avoidable. One example
 
from the sample was a possible manufacturing defect in equip­
ment which was the proximate cause of an accident while the
 
drillship was preparing for bad weather. From the sample,
 
ten of the 87 days lost were thus unavoidable, even if a per­
fect forecast were available. On this basis, 6.5 percent of
 
the days were lost to avoidable accidents; to be more conserv­
ative and because it is otherwise difficult to determine the
 
percentage of avoidable accidents, the accident delay experi­
ence measured (7.4 percent) is reduced by one-half to 3.7 per­
cent to account for unavoidable accidents. The adjustment
 
also reflects the fact that, because the accident is weather
 
related, some operational time would be lost even if the ac­
cident had not happened; frequently bad weather prevents re­
pairs from being completed rapidly.
 
The case study findings are that a drillship oper­
ating during a period of 1,170 days (during a five-year
 
period) suffered avoidable accidents which resulted in a 3.7
 
percent loss of time.
 
Assuming a daily drillship rate of $30,000 per day
 
and a 365 day operating year, the avoidable loss incurred is
 
estimated to be $407,000 per annum, for an operating drillship.
 
41
 
A drillship is assumed to be opea;xAtonaljy
 
effective throughout a year.
 
A semisubmersible is 
estimated to be susceptible
 
to the 
same types of accident as the drillship and is also
 
assumed to be operationally effective throughout a year. 
 The
 
daily rate for a semisubmersible 
is assumed to be $40,000.
 
Hence, the same accident percentage for a semisubmersible
 
implies an annual 
saving of about $543,000.
 
A jackup rig is assumed not to be susceptible to
 
weather related accident lost time. However, jackup rigs
 
are being built for deep water and 
severe weather conditions
 
and it seems unreasonable sus­to exclude them from accident 

ceptibility of the types tabulated in the 
case study which
 
deals with risers, BOP stacks and positioning anchors.*
 
Accordingly, all drilling rigs will be assumed 
to
 
be susceptible to a 3.7 percent loss 
of operating time aris­
ing from avoidable accidents that are 
weather prediction
 
avoidable.
 
Day rates for drill rigs are undoubtedly quite
 
variable. Offshore, February 1975, 
p. 48, gave the following
 
figures:
 
Jackups $30,000
 
Drillships 40,000
 
Semisubmersibles 60,000
 
offshore, January 1975, p. 55.
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Accordingly, accident related benefits to drilling 
rigs will be revised as follows: 
Accident Annual Losses to Drilling Rigs 
Drilling rig Daily rate ($) Annual Losses ($) 
Jackup 
 30,000 	 407,000
 
Drillship 
 40,000 	 543,000
 
Semisubmersible 
 60,000 	 814,000
 
The values obtained are quite conservative when compared
 
to a single accident loss of $5.4 million as discussed in
 
Section 2.
 
5.2 	 Case Study Results Summary
 
Losses to the offshore oil and gas industry have been
 
quantified for production, pipelaying and exploratory drilling.
 
These losses are all identified as being avoidable,
 
provided that weather and sea 
conditions can be appropriately
 
predicted ahead of time with sufficient quality.
 
The benefits are quantified as follows:
 
$0.06 million per mile of pipe laid and trenched
 
$0.19 million per production platform installed
 
$0.41 million per jackup rig drilling year
 
$0.54 million per drillship drilling year
 
$0.81 million per semisubmersible drilling year.
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The benefits for pipelaying and production platforms
 
require at least a 48-hour reliable weather and sea state
 
forecast for the operating location.
 
The benefits for exploratory drilling require a 24-hour
 
highly precise forecast to terminate or modify operations.
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6. OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY GENERALIZATION
 
The case study results, substant-iated by practical
 
operational data, are specific to the weather and sea
 
the Celtic
condition environment of the southern North Sea and 

are assumed to be identical
Sea. These two sea environments 

the operations of
in terms of the influence they may have on 

laying and trenching
interest, production platform erection, the 

of pipe and exploratory drilling. The benefits derived will
 
to the industry only beyond 1985,
essentially become available 

or the time SEASAT becomes operational.
 
a worldwide
Generalization of these benefits requires 

modeling of both oil and gas exploration and oil and gas
 
consistent with current
production, in a reasonable manner 

information, so that the incremental production and exploration
 
beyond 1985 can be established.. The time horizon for benefit
 
development will be the year 2000. Thus, to generalize fcr the
 
and gas industry, a projection of oil and gas
offshore oil 

and 2000 will be developed. it is clear
production between 1985 

the
that such a 25-year projection is very tentative because of 

These pressures
many pressures and constraints that exist. 

and constraints are political, legislative, financial and
 
technological, and are almost impossible to evaluate. Hence
 
itself be extremely
the projection modeling procedure will in 

6.1 
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simple, incorporating however many j'udgmental factors which
 
appear today to be reasonable. The 
factors of interest will be
 
presented in a subsequent section and then the model 
itself
 
will be developed, followed by the generalized benefit
 
estimation, together with some measure of 
the uncertainty of
 
these benefits.
 
Offshore Oil and Gas Production Data Factors
 
The offshore oil and gas production process is a logical
 
procedure which follows well defined steps each of which
 
requires specialized equipment 
for its success. The procedure
 
continues provided that the results of steps appear to be
 
economically viable. 
 This implies all forms of testing and
 
evaluation of the results of each step.
 
The equipment employed is changing quite rapidly in its
 
design concepts and capabilities. 
 The costs of the activities
 
are 
also changing quite rapidly. The search worldwide for
 
offshore oil and gas necessitates adaptation of procedures to
 
various forms of inclement sea conditions and weather and ice
 
formations or, 
in the Arctic and Antarctic operations, on and
 
through ice itself.
 
Certain statistics are very much needed to try to grasp
 
the scale of the operations, in time and financially.
 
Benefits that this industry may enjoy are 
related to exploration
 
and production offshore from 1985-2000. 
 These activities are
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very difficult to project largely because of costs, economics,
 
licensing agreements, national legislation and ecological
 
considerations. This section will try to give the flavor of
 
the industry as it appears today.
 
6.1.1. The Oil and Gas Extraction Process
 
Various steps are generally followed in extracting
 
offshore oil. Initially, following geological evaluation,
 
there is a geophysical survey and sample core drilling to
 
determine the mechanical properties of the seabed.
 
Subsequently drilling for various purposes is performed from
 
specialized rigs, known as jackups, semisubmersibles or
 
drillships depending on how they are supported during the
 
drilling operations. There are additionally other drilling
 
structures called a platform tender, a self-contained platform
 
and barge rigs which are used either separately or along with
 
production platforms. Drilling activity is called exploratory
 
or wildcat if oil discovery is the objective. When a discovery
 
is made, appraisal hole drilling is made to determine the
 
economic viability of the flows found in the discovery.
 
Delineation drilling is then undertaken to produce wells to
 
define the extent of the oil and gas that has been found and
 
prior to production, development wells are drilled.
 
Development wells are joined by pipe to well heads
 
which are connected to a production platform. The offshore
 
production platform is a complete oil and gas production and
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processing unit consisting of meters, separators, pressure
 
vessels, compressors, pumps, generators and control equipment.
 
Initially the production platform has drilling rigs associated
 
with it. The platform provides also life support and safety
 
equipment for up to 100 men and must maintain an 
inventory of
 
supplies on board.
 
Oil produced can be pumped into floating storage in
 
either a buoy or tanker, or more generally it is pumped through
 
welded pipes, laid and trenched on the sea floor, which
 
connect the production platform to an onshore storage.
 
Pipelaying is performed by special barges or by pipelaying
 
semisubmersibles.
 
In shallow water pipelines were joined or pipelines
 
were connected to a riser by means of flanges welded above
 
water. 
 In deeper waters, welding is performed below water on
 
the seabed in an inert pressurized atmosphere by saturation
 
diving welders. Thus wells can be completed by a technique
 
called subsea completion. The wells, essentially development
 
wells, are drilled by semisubmersible rigs, which is asserted,
 
to increase the demand for these rigs by 20 percenc.w
 
Evidently each step in the procedure is dependent on
 
the 'enevolence of the operating environment for its efficiency
 
of accomplishment. Benefits 
from weather and sea condition
 
forecasting are contained in economic losses which 
could be
 
*Offshore, January 1975, p. 
57.
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avoided if the environmental conditions were known ahead of
 
time. This implies that there are optional procedures, pre­
paration and actions that have been visualized and could be
 
invoked which would allow avoidance of the losses being con­
sidered. The general improvement in statistical knowledge of
 
the environment that satellites can provide will also serve
 
specifically to allow trends to equipment design optimization.
 
Otherwise there are many operating delays that sea conditions
 
and weather introduce into operations which essentially cannot
 
be avoided, only contended with, and which increase the cost of
 
oil and gas production.
 
6.1.2 offshore Oil and Gas Statistics
 
Geologists contend that the ultimate recoverable oil
 
in the world is about 300 billion tons or 2,191 billion barrels.
 
Already 40 billion tons has been produced, 90 billion tons is
 
in proven reserves and 170 billion tons have yet to be discov­
ered. Practically, geological estimates can be in error by a
 
factor ranging from two to ten. The only definite means of
 
identifying the quantity of oil is from drilling.
 
The 1973 world oil regional production is shown in
 
Figure 6.1. The largest single oil reserve is in Saudi Arabia
 
and is estimated to be 138 billion barrels.
 
The ultimate undiscovered recoverable offshore re­
serves has been estimated at 1,411 billion barrels or about
 
201 billion tons. During the last 25 years about 100 billion
 
barrels of oil have been discovered offshore. The currently
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Figure 6.1 1973 World Oil Regional Production
 
proven offshore reserves are about 115 billion barrels, 73
 
billion of which lie within 40 nautical miles (nm) of the
 
shore, the remainder being up to 200 nm from the shore.*
 
In 1972, offshore oil production was about 3.3
 
9 million barrels per day, about 18 per­billion barrels or 

cent of the world's total
 
* 
offshore, January 1975, p. 57.
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The world's gas reserve is estimated to be 2,033 trillion
 
cubic feet, the largest single reserve being in the 
U.S.S.R. and
 
is estimated to be 706 trillion cubic feet. 
 The 1972 gas
 
production was 500 trillion cubic feet, that of 
1973 about
 
520 trillion cubic feet. 
 The offshore gas reserve is estimated
 
to be 181 trillion cubic feet 
and 1972 offshore production was
 
about 50 trillion cubic feet 
or 10percent of the world's total.
 
Between 
1973 and 1974, world wide, about 18,804 miles
 
of pipe was laid, and the incremental oil production was
 
5.6 million barrels per day and the 
incremental gas production
 
was 20 trillion cubic feet. 
 Using the conversion that 1 cubic
 
foot of gas is equivalent to 1.7 x 10 - 4 barrels of oil 
and
 
assuming that all pipe laid was 
for incremental production,
 
the following incremental total is suggested:
 
incremental oil production 
 5.6 mb/d
 
equivalent incremental gas 9.3 mb/d
 
production
 
incremental total 14.9 mb/d
 
This indicates that each incremental oil and gas
 
production of 
1 million barrels per day requires an associated
 
1,254 miles of pipe to be laid. In the North Sea, with 
an in­
cremental production of about 4 million barrels per day it has
 
been estimated that 6,835 miles of pipe will be 
required or about
 
1,709 miles of pipe per million barrel per day of production.
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Oil and gas are depleted or produced on a worldwide
 
basis which tends to keep the ration of reserves to production
 
at about 30 to 1, but in some regions such as the U.S., this
 
ratio is about 11 to 1, which is still considered to be healthy.
 
To maintain a ratio evidently requires new oil discovery at the
 
value of the desired ratio multiplied by the depletion rate.
 
A production well produces on the average about
 
2,500 barrels per day but it can range up to 10,000 barrels per
 
day. Production pumps are either high volume 10,000 b/d or
 
low volume 2,500 b/d.* Production platforms produce from 20,000
 
to 
100,000 barrels per-day, and although from five to 66 wells
 
can be connected to one platform the most likely number being
 
from 30 to 40, but an average is about 60 wells. These are
 
development wells. To reenter a capped discovery well and 
com­
plete it takes about two weeks. Each new offshore well takes
 
from 30 to 40 days to complete so that a drilling vessel can
 
complete about eight wells per year.**
 
To increase offshore oil production by one million
 
barrels per day requires from ten to 50 production platforms
 
and about 400 wells to be drilled which requires about 50
 
drilling vessel years to complete. This incremental produc­
tion would require from 1,254 to 1,709 miles of pipe to be
 
laid. To maintain the requisite reserves to production ratio
 
Offshore, May 1975, p. 165.
 
Ibid., February 1975, p. 234.
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then requires oil to be discovered at the rate of 4 to 11
 
billion barrels per year, depending on the ratio, as re­
serves.
 
In increasing offshore production incrementally,
 
during the next ten years by 5.1 million b/d will require
 
46 drilling rigs per year.to be available.* This implies
 
that 46 drilling rigs in a year are responsible for an incre­
mental production of 0.51 million b/d or one drilling rig
 
per year can introduce an incremental production of 4.05
 
million barrels or 11,000 b/d. Assuming each well produces
 
2,500 b/d, each drilling rig is completing only four wells
 
per year, not eight. Evidently weather, sea state, the type
 
of rig and the geological formations can cause such variation.
 
Exploratory or wildcat drilling offshore is more
 
difficult to estimate because of the dry or nonproductive
 
holes and because of delineation drilling and the size of a
 
discovery per successful exploration hole. Frontier explor­
ation in the Arctic gives one find for every ten wells taken
 
down.** Worldwide, it appears reasonable to assume a success
 
ratio of one in five. In 1973, 500 exploratory holes were
 
drilled offshore.** The increment in reserves resulting
 
from these exploratory holes is not known. It will be assumed
 
Offshore, January 1973, p. 56.
 
Ibid., May 1975, p. 300.
 
Ibid., February 1973, p. 53.
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that during 1973 about 9 million barrels a day offshore were
 
produced (this is the figure for 1972) and that the incremen­
tal production was 9 percent as for the world in general.
 
Thus, the incremental offshore production in 1973 is estimated
 
to be 81 x 104 barrels per day and if a 30:1 reserve to pro­
duction ratio is assumed this implies a reserve increment of
 
24.3 million barrels per day or about 9 billion barrels.
 
Thus, each of the 500 exploratory holes might be conjectured to
 
lead to reserves of 18 million barrels or alternatively to an
 
increment in production of 1,620 barrels per day.
 
Of the 500 exploratory holes that are drilled only
 
100 will actually produce a find. As time goes by it can be
 
expected that exploration will become less and less success­
ful, but what form the decrease in success will take is not
 
known. Exploratory drilling can proceed at a rate of about
 
five holes per rig per annum.*
 
Studies have indicated that 2,500 exploratory holes
 
will have to be drilled in 1982**, and that in the North Sea
 
between 1975 and 1985, 2,000 exploratory holes will be drilled
 
in the North Sea.***
 
Studies have also identified offshore oil production
 
in 1980 as 11 million b/d (free world)****; in 1985 as a min­
imum incremental production of 26.6 million b/d with other
 
* 
Offshore, February 1975, p. 53.
 
Ibid.
 
Ibid., p. 73
 
Ibid.
 
54
 
increments to 31.7 million b/d and 51 million b/d for the
 
same year.* These estimates consider it reasonable to assume
 
30, 40 and 50 percent of the world's oil production to be
 
offshore at that time.
 
-
The simple assumed growth in oil production is at
 
the rate of 3.5 percent per annum. This gives a growth factor
 
of 1.41 by 1985, i.e., a production of about 78 million bar­
rels per day and 
a factor of 2.36 by 2000 or a production of
 
about 130 million barrels per day. Such a growth rate is a
 
reasonable one for financial purposes. 
 Growth in offshore oil
 
production is a very dependent parameter, dictated not only
 
by price but by political objectives and national desires.
 
The worldwide offshore production and reserves as
 
at the beginning of 1974 is tabulated in Table 6.1.**
 
6.1.3 Offshore Oil and Gas Economic and Cost Factors
 
Wells are qualified as economically viable for pro­
duction based on the estimated recoverable oil and gas reserves,
 
and the expected profit derivable from them in the world's mar­
ket relative to all expenditures of exploration, development,
 
production and transportation.
 
In the Arctic Islands a minimum recoverable reserve of
 
Offshore, January 1975, p. 55.
 
** 
International Petroleum Encyclopedia, 1975, pp. 267,
 
268, 269.
 
Table 6.1 Worldwide Offshore Production and Reserves
 
Country, state 
ABU DHABI 
Field 
um Shaif . . 
Discovery 
date 
1958 
Well 
Depth 
It 
9,150 
No. 
wells 
29 
1973 prod. (million bbl) 
55 
Cur. prod. 
1-1-74 (millionbl) 
384 
Est. rem. 
'reserves (million bbl) 
1,840 
Zakum 1964 9,100 43 106 471 812 
CABINDA Maaongo N,S & W. 1966 1,300 110 51 182 500 
ARGENTINA Cornodora Rivadavia 1907 NA NA 0.7 NA NA 
AUSTRALIA BarracoutaBarrow Island 
Halibut 
Kingfish
Mubarras . 
19681964 
1967 
1967 
1971 
4,500
2,200- 6,700 
7,500 
8,450 
11,000 
5 
318 
21 
42 
7 
2 
15 
55 
65 
5 
8 
83 
207 
144 
6 
494 
125 
438 
866 
50 
BRAZIL uaricemna 1968 3,540 8 1 1 100 
BRUNEI- /mpa S. W 1963 7,068- 8,155 84 45 223 2,118 
Patam 1967 9,500 24 14 38 61 
MALAYSIA \Wus[iLulong
8aka . 
Bqionia 
Cbampion 
Farley 
1965 
1971 
1970 
1970 
1969 
6,800 
11,000 
4,300 
10,740 
19 
2 
1 
8 
7 
19 
0 
0 4 
8 
9 
. 
63 
2 
0.9 
12 
17 
86100 
75 
.92 
141 
CONGOCONGO(I,'azzavillc) 
Fne,auee Marine 
Poinle Indienne 
1969 
1957 
1,930 
5,000 
14 
5 
12 
0.1 
13 
5 
500 
500 
DENMARK Dan ,, 1971 5,900. 6,562 4 1 1 90 
DUBAI Faieb 1966 7,600. 8,500 27 49 179 1,404 
EGYPT 
Faleb, S W. 
Belayim. 
1970 
1954 
7,500- 9,000 
7,000- 8,500 
12 
NA 
32 
NA 
32 
225 
1,000 
NA 
GABON 
El Morgan 
Aguilie Marine . 
1965 
1962 
5,500- 6,400 
8,300 
54 
16 
58.4 
10 
381 
43 
400 
131 
Port Genlil Ocean - 1964 8,100 3 1 9 12 
Tcliengue Ocean 1962 6,200 5 0.5 4 6 
Torpille Marine 
4nguihle, N . .... 
Angille, N W. 
1972 
1968 
1968 
1,200
7,480 
7,500 
1010 
2 
44 
1 
717 
1 
50146 
99 
Table 6.1 

Country, state 
GHANA 

INDONESIA 
IRAN 
ITALY (Sicily) 
JAPAN 
LIBYA 
MEXICO 
NEUTRAL ZONE 
NEW ZEALAND 
Worldwide Offshore Production and Reserves (continued)
 
Well Cum. prod. Est. rem. 
Discovery Depth No. 1973 prod. 1-1-74 reserves 
Field date it wells (millionbbl) (millionhh) (millionbld) 
Block 10 1970 7,700- 8;500 1 SI SI NA 
Ardluna 1971 3,760- 4,059 37 18 30 150 
Atlaka 1972 600- 7,800 33 21 42 235 
Cinla 1971 3,450- 3,869 9 13 29 150 
Kilty 1973 3,000- 4,400 6 0.6 0.6 150 
Bahrgansar 1960 9,000-12,300 7 7 92 946flendijan 1968 9,850-11,000 5 12 29 427Nowiouz 1966 8,587-10,850 10 15 39 930 
Cylus 1962 7,000 8 8 33 776 
Darius 1961 11,000 11 40 290 1,044
frallish 1969 9,750 10 13 33 527 
Rostam 1966 7,200- 9,800 23 14 69 954 
Sassan. 1967 7,500- 8,100 14 69 273 1,194 
Gela* 1956 10,800-11,150 10 4 70 82 
Ragusa 1954 12,460 30 3 103 40 
Kubiki 1934 1,099- 6,370 133 0.4 9 15 
Block 137 1972 NA I SI SI NA 
Arenque , 1970 11,362 6 3 6 994Alun 1966 9,040 10 2 27 896 
Cabo Nuevo 1967 5,753 3 0.6 8.6 10Isla do Lobes 1963 6,875 4 1 is 18 
Santa Ana 1959 9,517 10 0.4 28 10 
Tiburon 1965 7,314 6 0.4 4 7 20 
"out 1969 5,470- 9,130 26 217 70 929 
Khalji 1961 5,570-11,968 92 121 1,073 562 
Kapuni 1959 11,323-12,504 4 1 2.5 9 
Table 6.1 Worldwide Offshore Production and 

Well 
Country, state field 
Discovery 
date 
Depth 
it 
NIGERIA Delta Delta, South 
Ekpe 
[tim
Isan 
1965 
1965 
1966 
1968 
1970 
5,600- 9,400 
7,100- 9,200 
7,503 
6,147 
5,800- 9,000 
Malu 
Moli 
1969 
1965 
4,800. 6,300 
5,200-10,900 
Mereo 
Okan 
Parabe 
Asabo 
1965 
1964 
1968 
1966 
5,000- 7,500 
5,500- 8,900 
4,500- 8,200 
5,412 
Idehto 1966 8,436 
Ubdt 
Unim '...1966 
1968 4,842 
5,914 
Pennington 
blue 
., 
. . 
1964 
1966 
8,000-12,000 
5,014 
NORWAY EddaCodEkN . . .Ask 19721969I970 10,5009,75010,200-1 , 900  
Ekofisk West 
[Idfisk 
Tor 
1970 
1970 
1970 
10,000
9,500 
10,000 
PERU Humboldt 
Literal and Mirads 
Procidencia 
1960 
1960 
1967 
3,000- 7,500 
6000 
3,000- 6,000 
Others .... . . 
QATA R BillHanne ,Idd El Shargi 
Maydan-Matizan 
19701960 
1963 
6,000
4,500. 8,250 
7,000- 7,600 
SAUDI ARABIA Abu SarahBerri' 1963 1964 6,6507,450 
Manifa* 
Qalsf* 
Saansya*' 
Zusuf 
1957 
1945 
1951 
1965 
7,950 
7,050 
5,100 
5,800 
Reserves (continued)
 
Cum. prod. Est.rem. 
No. 1973 prodr 1-1-74 reserves 
wells (niill;oq bl) (millionhbhl) millon hbbl) 
11 7 37 89 
15 22 92 163
 
10 24 46 400
 
7 6 6 40
 
10 9 13 41 
14 7 25 84 
15 6 23 84 
34 33 146 382 
39 26 192 384 
24 14 38 77 
7 12 47 176 
3 2 19 60 
15 11 35 79 
7 14 21 65 
7 4.2 9.4 61 
5 7 8 43 
I ..41 15 33 1,985 
1 .... 	 NA 
.
 
1 (not producing) NA 
113 10 28 40 
93 2 25 18 
13 	 0.4 9.4 96 
3 0 1 1.6 10 
17 20 100 
14 15 1^8 1,977 
11 56 359 9,890 
10 
11 40 224 6,323 
37 227 450 5,476 
6 16 114 896 
4 42 417 8,623 
82 351 2,658 22,178 
7 29 29 100 
Table 6.1 Worldwide Offshore Production and Reserves (continued)
 
Country, state Field 
Discovery
date 
Well 
Depth
it 
No. 
wells 
Cum. prod.
1973 prod. 1-1-74 (million hhl) (million hhl) 
Est rem. 
reserves (million bbl) 
TRINIDAD-
TOBAGO 
N.MarineSoldado 
BrightonGaleotaTeak .... 
1959 
1955 
190819721972 
3,OO.15,o0O
5,100-11,000 
700- 7,5001,100- 6,3007,250:15,191 
1 
219 
1891512 
.01 
18 
10615 
1 
243 
640.716 
20 
168 
68 to60 
UNITED Forties 1970 7,000- 8,000 4 SI SI NA 
KINGDOM 
UNITED STATES Alaska, Granite PointMcArlhur River . 
Middle Ground Shoal 
Trading Bay . 
California, Algeria 
Belmont Offshore 
Carpinleria . . 
Coal Oil Point . . 
Conception 
Cuarta 
Dos Cuadras . 
Elwood South 
Huntington Beach* 
Rincon Offshore .... 
Montalvo West '... 
Santa Ynez , 
Summerland Offshore 
Wilminglon' ., 
Louisiana (giants only) 
Bay Marchand BIk 2 .. 
Eugene Island Elk. 126 
Eugene Island 91k 175 
Eugene Island Blk 276 
Grand Isle Blk 16 -
Grand Isle Bik. 43 
Grand Isle Bk 47 
8ain Pass Bik. 35 -
Main Pass BIk. 41 . 
Main Pass Bi 69 
Main pass BI 306 
1965
1965. 
1963 
1965 
1959 
1948 
1966 
1948 
1961 
1961 
1969 
1966 
1920 
1927 
1947 
1970 
1958 
1926 
1949 
1950 
1956 
1964 
1948 
1956 
1955 
1951 
1957 
1949 
1969 
8,772
9,572 
9,000 
5,650 
3,860 
3,644- 8,890 
3,892 
9,875 
6,845 
6,910 
3,673 
6,289 
2,500- 5,000 
2,400-11,500 
9,000-11,500 
8,700-10,000 
NA 
2,200- 5,850 
2,472-12,656 
4,000-12,000 
11,500 
6,08'- 8,700 
1,5,9-16,900 
2,325-13,600 
4,096-1',614 
6,001 
31,470- 8,047 
5,542- 8,791 
6167 
25 
52 
30 
42 
1 
76 
122 
3 
26 
3 
129 
20 
463 
101 
14 
I 
20 
2,'111 
299 
54 
82 
65 
85 
222 
81 
86 
121 
161 
125 
5 
39 
10 
8 
0.1 
2 
4 
0.1 
0.5 
1 
17 
0.9 
21.6 
0.8 
0.1 
SI 
1 
67 
33 
5 
10 
6 
19 
21 
5 
2 
15 
11 
7 
52 
214 
79 
49 
02 
37 
41 
1 
28.5 
6 
87 
6 
884.1 
27 
3 
SI 
25 
1,549 
397 
89 
29 
42 
198 
141 
61 
78 
1'4 
181 
26 
?8 
176 
100 
26 
0.5 
26 
31 
1 
45 
09 
88 
15 
129 
2 
05 
3,000 
47 
763 
253 
40 
at 
123 
152 
227 
39 
22 
146 
77 
124 
Worldwide Offshore Production and Reserves (continued)
Table 6.1 

Well 
Discovery Depth 
Country. state 	 Field date It 
S Marsh Island B1k 73 . . 1963 5-79n-11,69 
i 
81k 204 1968 7.588.11;60UNITED STATES Sip Shoal 1967 10,80"12.000Ship Shoal BIk. 207 
.. 1962 9,1(10-11,800continued Ship Shoal Bk. 203 24 1950 	 6.500. 9,800Soulh Pass 8lk. 1954 6,542-15,592South Pass MR0.27 1965 5,309-10,000South Pass Bk. 62 1969 8,033South Pass 91k. 65 1956 6,600- 1,000Texas, Federal Block 288 
,, 1968 4,721-11,248High Island 
U. 	S. S.R. Azerbaijan, Bakhar (Makarov Bank) 1968 12,800 
Baku Archipelago 1963 8,77?-16,608(Sangachaly.Duvnnyi-Bulla) 
1947 2,820- 5,800Izelbas".. 1949 600- 5,406Neihanye Kamni 1961 3.116- 8,200Turkmen, Cheleken 
1930 2,170Baclaqueroh," , 1917 2,200VENEZUELA 	 Cabiras' 
Zulia State 	 Lagunillask* 1926 q,00012,568 
1956 9,600-11,000 
Centro .. 	 1957 
Ceuta 1957 8,120Lania 1958 11,003Lamar .. 
Mone Grande 1914 4 112 1928 3,000Tia Juana* . 
11,825ZAIRE 	 GC-IX 1970 
NA-Not available. SI-Shut in (not producing). *-Partly onshore. **-Boliva. Coastal (39 billin 
.,c 
0D 
No. 1973 prod. 
wells (million hbll 
44 
63 
5"
5 
51 
81 
7 
11 
423 17 
?41 11 
68 9 
71 12 
22 0.7 
22 0.6 
7 5 
100 36 
50 1 
1,290 
20 
45 
1 
2,170
520 
216 
32 
3.120
73 
326 
46 
61 26 
228 105 
23 53 
292 5 
1,780 120 
1 NA 
bbl ultimate recovery) 
Cum.prod.1-1-74 
(million bbi) 
?6 
21 
-8 
82 
356 
247 
42 
36 
6 
1 
12 
136 
21 
760 
6 
4,164
1,2.39 
8.3"0328 
221 
1,789
646 
577 
2,792 
NA 
Est.rem. 
reserves 
(million b0b) 
69 
84 
137 
143 
134 
1.8 
148 
154 
50 
40 
NA 
900 
NA 
500 
9 
461 
428 
895 
1.195 
23 
1,170 
NA 
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500 million barrels is an approximate qualification for oil with
 
a minimum of 19 trillion cubic feet for gas.
 
In the North SeaL the reserves of the Cormorant field
 
at 200 million barrels are described as meager although the
 
field will go into production by pipeline linkage into another
 
w*
 
production complex.
 
In 1973 development costs in the North Sea were
 
estimated at $2,400 per barrel of oil per day produced; in 1974
 
this figure was revised to $3,700 per barrel of oil per day. In
 
one field, Heather, these costs are estimated to be $7,000 per
 
barrel per day, a field estimated to have a production cap­
ability of 50,000 barrels per day.
 
The Brent field in the North Sea with recoverable
 
reserves of 2 billion barrels and an expected production from
 
300,000 to 500,000 b/d has been developed at a cost of more
 
than $1.8 billion, about 8 percent of the total capital of
 
its owners Shell and Exxon. Spending by British Petroleum
 
(BP) in their Forties field development represents about 25
 
percent of BP issued capital and reserves.***
 
The development of the North Sea, United Kingdom
 
sector by 1985, to a production level of 7 million barrels
 
per day (official goal is about 2 to 2.8 million barrels per
 
Offshore, May 1975, pp. 300 and 301.
 
**Ibid., February 1975, p. 84.
 
***Offshore, January 1975, p. 106.
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day) will require $25 billion of capital during the next
 
decade and possibly an additional $10 billion for gas de­
velopment.
 
During the next decade it has been estimated that
 
offshore developments will require $770 bilhion of capital.
 
The total assets of the world's 300 lending banks total
 
$1.9 trillion. Four hundred fifty billion dollars is esti­
mated to be required for placing platforms, development well
 
drilling, buoy moorings or pipelines and shore terminals.
 
It is expected that offshore areas outside Europe and North
 
America may suffer as a consequence of these large capital
 
requirements.
 
Drilling exploratory holes can cost $3 million to
 
$11 million per hole depending on location, as can all
 
other types of drilling. Day rates for a drilling rig
 
have generally been one-tenth of 1 percent of the rig's
 
price, or $1,000 for each million dollars of a rig's cost.
 
This is currently thought to be climbing to $1,200 to
 
$1,500. A large semisubmersible equipped for deepwater
 
drilling, costing $40 million, could have a daily rate of
 
$60,000. Feasibility studies are being conducted for a
 
larger new gene-ration of semisubmersibles with a value of
 
$80 million.**
 
*Ibid.
 
**Offshore, May 1975,
 
62
 
Technology is 
providing compact semisubmersible
 
drilling rigs 
( < 6,000 tons of 
steel compared to a giant
 
> 9,000 tons 
of steel) expected to be priced at 
$22 million,
 
cutting the day rate 
by 50 percent.. 
It is thought that the
 
compact vessels 
can 
operate very effectively in 300-600 feet
 
of water. 
 Some contractors believe that during the 
next decade
 
most activity will really take place in these relatively shal­
low waters and the number 
of large semisubmersibles most effec­
tive in the hostile environment of the North Sea, Eastern
 
Canada, Gulf of Alaska, Africa and Australia, may be curtailed.
 
These hostile environments 
are 
in total about 5 percent of the
 
offshore regions currently being developed.*.
 
The rig population for May 1975, 
including units
 
under construction is 
shown as follows:
 
World Rig Population
 
This Month 
 Six Months Ago 
 One Year Ago

May 1975 
 Nov 1974 
 May i974
 
En 
 En
Working En
Idle Route Working Idle Route 
Working Idle 
 Route

Louisiana 
 41 2 0 
 42 4 
 0
Texas 39 8 1
14 0 0 
 17 2 0 
 19 1 0
Mafla 
 5 0 
 0 

..U. S. Pacific 
 3 3 
 0 4 
 2 0 2
Africa 7 0
23 0 
 0 20 1 
 2 18
Atlantic 0 0
2 1 2 
 1 0 0
Australia ..5 0 
 0 4 0
Canada & Great Lakes 0 7 0 0
5 5 0 
 13 1 0 
 7
Caribbean 3 0
3 0 1 
 3 0 0
Japan 2 0 0
1 0 
 0 2 
 0 0 1
Mediterranean 0 0
14 0 
 0 6 0 
 0 7
Mexico 0 0
3 0 
 0 3 0
Middle East 0 3 0
34 1 0
0 31 1 1 
 30
North Sea 0 1
48 1 1 
 45 0 0 
 41
South America 0 2
29 0 
 1 28 0 1 
 22
Southeast Asia 2 8
39 0 0 
 30 1 0 
 25 1 0
Total 
 275 13 
 5 249 12 
 4 226 22 
 7
 
Units under construction: 
 drtllship 51; 
Jackups 63; semisubmersibles 59; 
total 163.
 
Ibid., February 1975, p. 46.
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The worldwide rig population, shown above was
 
assumed for total existing rig units and under construction
 
along with the average quoted contract drilling day rates.*
 
Assuming an 85 percent utilization factor and assuming con­
tract drilling to be about 50 percent of the total cost,
 
drilling annual expenditures are about $4.5 billion, essen­
tially for wildcats or exploration. Based on construction
 
lead times of 24 months for shipshapes** and 30-36 months for
 
semisubmersibles or 
jackups, and worldwide annual production
 
of 50 units per 
annum and the need for 2,500 exploratory holes
 
in 1982, there will be a requirement for 500 to 625 rigs at
 
Rig Assumed
 
Type Number Average Day Rate Daily Cost
 
Jackups 152 
 $ 15,000 $ 2,228,000
 
Drillships/Barges 
 69 20,000 1,380,000
 
Semisubmersibles 126 
 30,000 3,780,000
 
Total 347 
 $ 7,388,000
 
Offshore, February 1975, pp. et.
48 seq.
 
** shipshape is a ship used as a drilling platform drill­
ship or conversion.
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that time. A new design for a semisubmersible, fabricated in
 
concrete at a price of $36 million, has a delivery of 15-18
 
months.
 
Based on the tabulated current rig population the
 
projection to 1980 would give 564- rigs and 662 rigs by 1982.
 
Allowing for retirements and losses, this should be in the
 
range of drilling requirements,, and is about as far ahead
 
as is reasonable for a projection of rigs because of economic,
 
political and financial uncertainties.*
 
Current Mobile Exploratory Rigs (12/74)
 
Total
 
Under Projected
 
Existing % Construction (1978) %
 
Jackups 134 51 55 189 45
 
Drillships/Barges 62 24 36 98 24
 
Semisubmersibles 
 64 25 63 127 31
 
260 100 154 414 100
 
*Submersibles and tenders are excluded (Source: Offshore
 
Rig Data Services)
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Assumptions are that rigs can drill five or four
 
holes per annum. In the Arctic rigs can most likely only
 
drill three holes per annum.
 
Several rig forecasts have been published. One
 
forecast is parametric based on a 1985 world oil production
 
of 102 million b/d of which offshore production could be
 
35, 40, 45 or 50 percents The other rig demand is defined on
 
the assumption of seeking to 
fully explore the estimated non­
explored 201 billion tons of oil, offshore. The ideal rig
 
fleet mix was determined from study of bathymetry in water
 
depths to 3,000 feet, worldwide weather data, rig mobility and
 
geological formations. It was concluded that there will be
 
sufficient rough water work in demand in eastern Canada,
 
Africa, Australia and the North Sea to keep the current, under
 
construction and planned semisubmersible fleet fully occupied
 
until retirement. Uncertainty, political and economic, when
 
taken into account in the study leads to a conclusion that in
 
1985 40 percent or more of the worldwide production will be
 
offshore with a rig demand for 600 units by 1982. Longer term
 
estimates based on reserves 
and expected production lead to a
 
conclusion of a demand for up to 60 new rigs per year for the
 
next 15 years.
 
These projections (shown below) indicate that little
 
attention has been given to economics, which are evidently
 
sensitive to the price of oil and the price of capital.
 
o
Offshore, January 1975, p. 53, et. seq.
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RIG FORECAST BASED ON OFFSHORE PRODUCTION
 
1985 offshore production
million b/d 
, 
35.7 40.8 46.0 51.0 
1985 less 1972 offshore 
production, million b/d 26.6 31.7 36.9 41.9 
Unplanned rigs required 
in 1976-1981 
per year 
0 36 72 108 
Retirements per year in 
at 1/2 of 20 year rate 
1975 
5 5 5 5 
Losses per year at 
1975-1981 
1% in 
4 5 6 7 
Total unplanned construction
 
per year in 1976-1981 9 46 83 120
 
Cumulative unplanned
 
construction in 1976-1981 54 264 498 720
 
Cumulative unplanned
 
construction in 1982 operation 0 216 432 648
 
Cumulative planned and
 
unplanned construction in
 
1982 operation 375 591 807 1,023
 
Note: 	 Planned construction represents rigs that have already
 
been committed for construction. Unplanned construction
 
thus represents rigs not yet committed for construction.
 
IDEAL RIG MIX IN CONSTRUCTION
 
World oil production offshore
 
Percentage of total production 40 45 50
 
Total units in 1982 operation 591 807 1023
 
Existing fleet plus unplanned construction
 
Ideal 48% jackups 284 387 491
 
Ideal 27%-drillships 159 218 276
 
Ideal 25% semisubmersibles 	 148 202 256
 
Unplanned construction only
 
Jackups 123 226 330
 
Drillships 67 126 184
 
Semisubmersibles 26 80 134
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RIG DEMAND 1975-2025 BASED ON RESERVES
 
Case 1 2 3 4 
Construction period for unplanned 
mobile rigs (years) 
Year last unplanned rig built 
25 
2000 
20 
1995 
15 
1990 
10 
1985 
Estimated number rigs 
subsea completion 
to perform 
72 72 72 72 
Total number unplanned rigs at 
25-year rig life 
Number rigs/year to be constructed 
in 1976 and onwards 
850 
34 
850 
42 
850 
57 
850 
85 
Number first class rigs 
operation 
in 
1975 375 375 375 375 
1980 470 510 585 725 
1985 565 645 795 1075 
1990 660 780 1005 1000 
1995 755 915 930 925 
2000 850 840 855 850 
2005 680 630 570 425 
2010 510 420 285 0 
2015 340 210 0 
2020 170 0 
2025 0 
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Pipelaying rates are established in the following Brown
 
and 	Root Inc. advertisement:
 
Brown & Root lay barge BAR-324 recently
 
established a triple world record:
 
1. 	Laying 134 forty-foot lengths of
 
32" pipe in a 12-hour shift;
 
2. 	Laying 234 lengths in a 24-hour
 
period
 
3. 	Sustaining a six-day average of
 
205 lengths of 32" diameter pipe
 
per 24-hour shift.
 
These records were established on
 
a 110-mile, 32" diameter pipeline in
 
depths of up to 420 feet. At the same
 
time0 BAR-323 was laying a 55-mile section
 
of 30-inch pipeline in depths to 497 feet.
 
The best rate on this project was
 
236 lenths in one 24-hour period. Until
 
that time, no one had ever attempted to
 
lay lines of such diameters at such depths
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Assuming that each pipe length is 40 feet, this
 
establishes the pipelaying rate in 4&0-500 feet of water 
as
 
something less than
 
236 x 40 = 1.79 miles per day. 
5280 
Pipe is both laid and trenched, requiring special
 
vessels for each phase of the work. Current costs'are
 
$20-$30 million for a trenching barge, $30-$40 million for a
 
derrick barge and at least $50 million for 
a lay barge. In
 
the later 1960's a derrick barge cost was $6-$8 million, and
 
a 400 lay barge cost was $8-$10 million. A derrick barge in
 
the deep North Sea that is used for platform construction and
 
platform module installation may accomodate 200 men.
 
Assuming day rates for this equipment is as for rigs,
 
i.e., $1,000-$1,500 per $ million of capital costs, the follow­
ing rates are estimated.
 
Trenching barges $20,000-$45,000 per day
 
Derrick barges $30,000-$60,000 per day
 
Lay barges $50,000-$75,000 per day
 
Pipelaying and trenching in 400-500 feet of water
 
could then cost from $39,000-$67,000 per mile, assuming
 
trenching proceeds at the same rate as pipelaying.
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The largest pipelaying vessel in the world, which is
 
190 meters long is estimated to have a price of $56.4 million.
 
Pipelaying studies indicated that pipe of up to 50 cm diameter
 
(20 inches). can be layed in water of depth from 300-400 meters
 
(980-1,310 feet).
 
Northern North Sea production platforms are physically
 
about twice as large as anything produced before. Platforms
 
are standing in 500 feet of water, the latest discovery in the
 
northern North Sea, the Magnus field, is in 623 feet of water.
 
Studies have indicated production feasibility in up to 800 feet
 
of water.
 
The platform structures are either fabricated from
 
steel or from concrete. The operational components of the
 
platform are added in modules that weigh each about 1,200 tons
 
and need special derrick barges to lift them.
 
Platform structures are priced from $60 million to $84
 
million. The installed platform costs are $85 million to more
 
than $144 million. In December 1974 a platform was ordered for
 
the Ninian field at a price of $140 million, with delivery set
 
for summer 1977, about 30 months later. Final delineation of
 
this field was completed in September 1974 and production is ex­
pected in 1978. The Forties field was discovered in 1970. Ini­
tial production is expected in July 1974 at which time the pipe­
line will be completed. In the Norwegian sector the Stratfjord
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field was 
discovered in March 1974 with recoverable re­
serves 
of 2 billion barrels and 1.8 trillion cubic feet of
 
gas. It is expected to go on stream in 1980 at which time
 
the Norwegian production is planned to be 374 million bar­
rels of 
oil and 1.06 trillion cubic feet of gas. Production
 
from the Ekofisk field in 1974 
was 13.4 million barrels, for
 
1975 the plan is for 54.3 million barrels and for 1976 the
 
plan is for 
189 million barrels. In other fields, production
 
will move from 100,000 barrels/day in 1974. to 500,000 barrels/
 
day in 1976. It is worth noting that a compressor problem
 
in production has delayed an increase in production from
 
40,000 barrels/day to 100,000 barrels/day from mid-1974 to
 
late 1975.* This gives some relativity to benefit from wea­
ther in relationship to benefits from equipment design and
 
reliability. 
 At $5.00 per barrel the oil not produced has a­
basic value of about $110 million for which the capital cost
 
alone could be $11 million.
 
Drilling capability is in water depths up to 3,000 feet.
 
The jackup from 20 to 300 feet; drillships from 40 to 3000
 
feet; semisubmersibles from 100 to 3,000 feet. Conventional
 
moorings using anchors are limited to 1,000 to 2,000 feet.
 
Drilling guidelines are being replaced by acoustical reentry.
 
Blow off preventers (BOP) are designed to operate in 
more
 
than 2,000 feet of water, with a capability to go to 4,000
 
feet and are ready to go to 6,000 feet. The riser for mud
 
Offshore, February 1975, p. 71.
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recirculation is currently the impediment to drilling up
 
to 5,000 to 10,000 feet.
 
Dynamic positioning is considered to be adequate
 
to drilling in from 500-10,000 feet of water and position has
 
been held in a combination of 22-foot-high waves, 65-mph
 
winds and 1.5-knot currents. Many components are in short
 
supply such as 
electric motors, bearings and transformers.
 
Drill casings and drill pipe have a four-year ordering lead
 
time.
 
Supply support is of great concern in heavy weather
 
operations. An incident is cited of a 21-day delay in deliv­
ery to a rig of essential drilling supplies because of heavy
 
weather which, at $75,000 per day cost about $1.6 million.*
 
Again, this gives relativity to losses from weather predic­
tion inadequacies.
 
Offshore oil hot spots 
or regions for exploration
 
are identified as the North Sea, eastern Canada, the East
 
Coast of the United States and the Gulf 
of Alaska. Future
 
areas are 
the Bering Sea and Bristol Bay, the offshore Beau­
fort Sea, the offshore of Prudhoe Bay and the Arctic 
Island
 
area.** Other 
regions of great promise are the Mediterranean,
 
the Phillippines, Indonesia, the Indian Ocean and the Formosa
 
Straits.
 
Offshore, February 1975, p. 117.
 
Ibid., p. 110, et. seq.
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The Indian Ocean potential reserves and rig activ­
ity are tabulated as follows:
 
INDIAN OCEAN RIG ACTIVITY 1970-1975
 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
 
South Africa 2 2 1 1 1
 
Mozambique 3 2 1 1
 
Malagasy Republic 2 3 1
 
Oman 1 1
 
India 1 1 2*
 
Sri Lanka (Ceylon)
 
Tanzania 1 1
 
Pakistan 1 1 1
 
Somalia
 
Open Sea 1 1 1
 
Total 8 5 5 5 5
 
-One will move into this area this year.
 
POTENTIAL INDIAN OCEAN OIL RESERVES
 
Country Billion bbl
 
Malagasy Republic 1 - 10
 
Mozambique 1 - 10
 
Tanzania 1 - 10
 
Kenya 1 - 10
 
Somalia 1 - 10
 
P.D.R. Yemen 1 - 10 
Oman 10 - 100 
Pakistan 10 - 100 
India 10 - 100 
Sri Lanka 0.1 - 1 
Bangladesh 1 - 10 
POTENTIAL INDIAN OCEAN GAS RESERVES
 
Country Trillion cu ft
 
Malagasy Republic 1 - 10
 
Mozambique 10 - 100
 
Tanzania 1 - 10
 
Kenya 0.1 - 1
 
Somalia 0.1 - 1
 
P.D.R. Yemen 1 - 10 
Oman 1 - 10 
Pakistan 1 - 10 
India 10 - 100 
Sri Lanka 0.1 - 1 
Bangladesh 10 - 1000 
i
Ibid., April 1975, p.
 
6.2 
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Worldwide Oil and Gas Production Projections
 
Data and factors from the last section will be se­
lected and composed into a single model which will project
 
offshore oil and gas production and exploration from 1975 to
 
the year 2000.
 
6.2.1 Modeling Considerations
 
Current deep water production platforms cost about
 
$140 million installed. It will be assumed that an onshore
 
facility to receive, process and distribute the received oil
 
will cost about the same.
 
Pipeline capital investment is about $8 billion for
 
6,835 miles of pipe or about $1.2 million per mile. Since
 
pipelaying and trenching on the average costs about $53,000
 
per mile, this cost will be assumed to be included in the $1.2
 
million figure.
 
If a production platform produces about 100,000
 
barrels of oil per day, then associated with the platform is
 
from 125 to 175 miles of pipe at an investment cost of about
 
$150 million.
 
Thus, in a very simplified manner each production
 
complex can be estimated to require an investment of about
 
$450 million. In the next decade the capital requirement for
 
production has been estimated at $450 billion.* This implies
 
1,000 production platforms, whose total production would be
 
Offshore, May 1975, p. 442.
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about 100 million barrels per day of oil or gas equivalent.
 
This is an estimated incremental production after some as yet
 
undefined time interval, even though the capital is 
an
 
estimated requirement before 1985.
 
Production in the Gulf of Mexico, which exceeded all
 
the experts estimates proceeded as follows.
 
Year Production
 
1947 3400 barrels
 
1957 52.8 million barrels
 
1967 284 million barrels
 
1970 401 million barrels
 
1974 311 million barrels
 
Excluding the first decade production increases are by a
 
factor, five in ten years and a factor seven in 20 years
 
approximately. Given the current oil extraction urgency
 
and also the demand for investment capital it does not
 
seem unreasonable that 100 million barrels per day may be
 
achieved in 25 years (2000) from the current production of
 
about ten million barrels per day.
 
It will therefore be assumed that 100 million barrels
 
per day by 2000 will be a reasonable production goal for
 
offshore oil alone.
 
REPRODUCILITY OF THE
 
ORAI NAL PAGE IS POOR
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If this is reasonable then the production in 1985
 
must be determined to generalize the benefits of SEASAT to
 
both exploration and the production of oil and gas.
 
To achieve such an increment in production requires
 
appropriate drilling activity to discover and to establish
 
reserves. If the current offshore production is ten million
 
barrels per day or about 3.7 billion barrels annually then the
 
current reserves of 115 billion barrels support this
 
production at a ratio of 30:1, reserves to production. The
 
major constraint, as far as reserve development is concerned, is
 
the estimated 1,411 billion barrels of undiscovered offshore oil.
 
If the average production per day over 25 years is 55 million
 
barrels, then the integrated consumption over the time period
 
would be 502 billion barrels which seems reasonable in terms of
 
the 	undiscovered oil that is estimated to exist.
 
To 	try and develop a systematic estimate of production
 
with time, the following assumptions will be made.
 
1. 	 At January 1st, 1975 there were 300 prime
 
operating rigs.
 
2. 	 Shipyards can produce 50 rigs per year. Rigs
 
become obsolescent at the rate of five per year
 
and about five rigs per year are lost to a variety
 
of causes at sea. Thus, the incremental annual
 
increase in rig population is 40.
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3. 	 Rig production will be pursued until 1985 at which
 
time no new rigs will be produced. By then it is
 
reasoned the world's shipyards will be
 
concentrating on production platform production and
 
the construction of sea going equipment necessary
 
to production.
 
4. Exploration drilling will be performed at the rate
 
of 	four holes per annum per vessel.
 
5. Each such hole drilled will add 1,620 barrels per
 
day 	to eventual production or 18 million barrels
 
per 	oil to reserves.
 
6. 	 During the period up to 1985 it will be assumed
 
that from discovery to production takes five
 
years; from 1985 to 2000 it will only take four
 
years. This is an improvement developed from
 
learning, etc.
 
7. 	 Exploration beyond 1985 will not be as successful
 
as prior to 1985. Tentatively the success will be
 
linear, declining from 1 in 1985 to 0.5 in 1995
 
remaining constant beyond.
 
8. 	 The drill rig fleet will be fully utilized.
 
9. 	 Each one million barrels per day of production
 
requires from 1,254 to 1,709 miles of pipe to
 
be laid and trenched.
 
With these assumptions the following simple method
 
exploration and production is developed, Table 6.2.
 
____ ___ ___ 
____ ___ _  __ 
____ ___ 
___ ____ 
offshore Oil Exploration and Production Model
 Table 6.2 
Pr im A vqnriatiod Rxplorat ion 
Inc r,2ill Ont A lI aLIVe Drilling Exploratory 

Date 
Rigs 
Operating 
Holes 
Per Annum 
1/1/75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
300 
340 
380 
420 
460 
500 
1200 
1360 
1520 
1660 
1840 
2000 
1/1/81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
540 
580 
620 
660 
700 
2160 
2320 
2480 
2640 
2800 
1/1/86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
690 
680 
670 
660 
650 
640 
630 
620 
610 
600 
590 
2760 
2720 
2680 
2640 
2600 
2560 
2520 
2480 
2440 
2400 
2360 
1/1/97 
98 
99 
2000 
580 
570 
560 
550 
2320 
2280 
2240 
2200 
Production Succes's 
Millions b/d Factor 
1.94 1 
2.20 1 
2.46 1 
2.72 1 
2.98 1 
3.24 1 
1
3.50 

3.76 1 

4.02 1 

1
4.28 

4.54 1 
0.95
4.47 

4.41 0.90 

4.34 0.85 

4.28 0.80 

4.21 0.75 

4.15 0.70 

0.65
4.08 

0.60
4.02 

0.55
3.95 

3.89 0.50 

3.82 0.50 

will not give rise to 

until after the year 

Incrurn.,It 
To Production
 
Millions b/d
 
1.94
 
2.20
 
2.46
 
2.72
 
2.98
 
3.24
 
5.54 

3.50
 
3.76
 
4.02
 
4.28
 
4.54 
0.10 

4.25
 
3.97
 
3.69
 
3.42
 
3.16
 
2.91
 
2.65
 
2.41
 
2.17
 
1.95
 
1.91
 
32.49 

Incremental production
prior to 1985
 
Incremental production

between 1985 and 2000
 
Incremental production
between 1985 and 2000
 
any production
 
2000
 
___ ___ 
___ ____ 
___ ___ 
-O0 
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6.2.2 Results of the Model
 
Assuming the 1974 offshore oil production to be
 
ten million barrels per day, the incremental production
 
prior to 1985 will be 15.5 million barrels per day, for a
 
total production in 1985 of 25.5 million barrels per day.
 
Incremental annual growth is shown in the model.
 
Between 1985 and 2000 the incremental production
 
will be (20.1 + 32.5) or 52.6 million barrels per day for
 
a total production in the year 2000 of 78.1 million bar­
rels per day. This total production is less than the 100
 
million barrels per day that seemed reasonable. The dis­
covered reserves will then have to be about 855 billion
 
barrels of oil or about 61 percent of the estimated cur­
rently undiscovered offshore oil. This amount is about
 
8.6 times the amount discovered in the last 25 years.
 
During the years from 1985 to 2000, 526 produc­
tion platforms will have to be fabricated and installed,
 
each capable of producing 100,000 barrels of oil per day.
 
Production will also require from 65,940 to 89,893 miles
 
of pipe to be laid and trenched. The drilling rig fleet
 
will be assumed to have the ideal composition of 48 per­
cent jackups; 27 percent drillships and 25 percent semi­
submersibles, these ratios holding throughout the time
 
period of interest.* The composition at its maximum in
 
1985 would then be:
 
*Offshore, January 1975, p. 53.
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Jackups 336
 
Drillships 189
 
Semisubmersibles 175
 
A conservative estimate of the world's total oil pro-­
duction, using a growth factor of 3-1/2 percent per annum, is
 
that in 1985 it will be 78 million barrels per day and in the
 
year 2000, 130 million barrels per day. Thus, in 1985 and
 
2000, offshore oil accounts for about 33 and 60 percent of the
 
world's total oil production.
 
The estimated investment capital required for the
 
model's output between 1975 and 2000 is identified as follows.
 
Production capital $(681 x 450) million $ 306 billion
 
Development capital $3500 x 106
68.1 	x 238 billion
 
Drilling rig capital
 
192 jackups at $30 million 6 billion
 
108 drillships at $40 million 4 billion
 
100 	semisubmersibles at
 
$60 million 
 6 billion
 
Estimated total capital requirement .$ 560 billion
 
The average annual capital requirement is about
 
$22 billion. The annual cost for drilling will be between
 
about $5 billion and $11 billion depending on the number of
 
prime rigs operating.
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The financing requirements are appreciable. Up to 1985
 
however the capital needs are about $140 billion or about 11
 
percent of the estimated capital needs of the oil industry by
 
this time for about 33 percent of the production.*
 
6.3 Generalized Offshore Oil and Gas Benefits (1985-2000)
 
From the model the following benefit variables are
 
extracted for 1985-2000.
 
Production platforms emplaced 526 (100,000 b/d)
 
Average amount of pipe laid 77,916 miles
 
Average annual size of drilling
 
rig fleet 625
 
Average number of platforms
 
per annum 35
 
Average amount of pipe laid
 
and trenched per annum 5,194 miles
 
Drilling rig fleet
 
Number of jackups 300
 
Jackup daily cost $30,000
 
Number of drillships 169
 
Drillship daily cost $40,000
 
Number of semisubmersibles 156
 
Semisubmersible daily cost $60,000
 
Offshore, May 1975, p. 442.
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Using these variables, without adjustment for either
 
the regional weather relative distribution over the world's
 
offshore oil production regions or for benefits exclusive to
 
SEASAT's data contribution the benefits in Table 6.3 are
 
estimated, using the case study derived benefit figures.
 
Thus, the estimated worldwide unadjusted annual benefit
 
to the offshore industry as a result of loss reductions in
 
production and pipelaying and exploratory drilling is
 
$657.8 million. If all the envisaged activity took place in
 
an environment with weather and sea conditions identical to the
 
southern North Sea then this would be the annual potential
 
benefit.
 
To the extent that worldwide offshore oil production
 
is located away from the southern North Sea this potential
 
benefit must be adjusted. How this production will be actually
 
Table 6.3 	 Unadjusted Annual Generalized Offshore Oil
 
and Gas Benefit
 
To platform construction 35 x $0.19 million = $ 6.7 million 
To pipelaying etc. 5194 x $0.06 million = 311.6 million 
To jackups 13.51 x 300 x $30,000 = 121.6 million 
To drillships 13.51 x 169 x $40,000 = 91.3 million 
To semisubmersibles 13.51 x 156 x $60,000 = 126.6 million 
Total unad3usted annual benefit 	 $ 657.7 million
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generated between 1985 and 2000 is difficult to forecast because
 
of the expectation of political and economic control of depletion
 
rates, licensing practices by various national jurisdictions
 
and the movement to national oil self-sufficiency by many
 
nations, as well as the economic and ecological constraints on
 
development, and the future price of oil.
 
By 1985 it seems clear that the governments of Great
 
Britain and Norway will have moved their oil resources into
 
healthy production compared to 1975. It seems also likely by
 
then that production from the Gulf of Mexico, Persian Gulf,
 
Venezuela and the South China Seas, possibly also West Africa
 
and Australia,will not have shifted greatly in a relative
 
sense. California by then could be a strong producer as could
 
the Indian Ocean, Indonesia and the Mediterranean. It is not
 
however clear what assumptions might be reasonable about the
 
Arctic, eastern Canada and the eastern United States.
 
Yet by 1985, following the results of the model the
 
incremental oil production must have increased from ten million
 
barrels per day to 25.5 million barrels per day.
 
By 1985 a large fraction of the incremental production
 
could be accounted for as follows:
 
United Kingdom southern North Sea 1 million b/d
 
United Kingdom northern North Sea 6 million b/d
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Norway northern North Sea 2.2 million b/d
 
General producing regions
 
increment from 1975 4 million b/d
 
This gives a form to about 85 percent of the esti­
mated increment. The remainder, some 2.3 million b/d could
 
be distributed throughout the world, 75 percent in weather and
 
sea condition benign region, 25 percent in-weather and sea
 
condition regions comparable to the southern North Sea. In
 
concept the benign regions are the Indian Ocean, Indonesia and
 
the Mediterranean, the nonbenign regions in the Arctic, easte-rn
 
Canada and the eastern United States. The subdivision is a
 
judgmental one, reflecting the technical difficulties in oil
 
production.
 
This is the period of a great rush to get the North
 
Sea into production. It appears that beyond 1985 the incremen­
tal production will be well controlled, by the governments in­
volved.
 
By 1985 California may be producing one million b/d,
 
provided that the ecological problems can be resolved.
 
Table 6.4, Offshore Oil Weather Weighting, indicates
 
the weighting applied to the previous offshore oil generaliza­
tion.* This particular table will be reconstructed judgmen­
tally to reflect what might be reasonable in 1985 as Table 6.5.
 
Econ, Inc., SEASAT Economic Assessment, 74-2001-11,
 
contract NASW-2558, p. 8-7 et. seq.
 
Table 

World Offshore 

Production 

Percentage 

2.5 

7 

25.5 

3.9 

4.1 

1.8 

36.6 

6.5 

3.2 

6.4 Offshore Oil Weather Weighting
 
Major Offshore 

Producing Area 

North Sea 

Gulf of Mexico 

Venezuela 

Bass Straits 

South China Seas 

Gulf of Alaska 

Persian Gulf 

West Africa 

California 

Beaufort 

Frequency 

% (1) (2) 

10 

2 

0.5 

14 

0.3 

9 

0 

1 

0.5 

Beaufort
 
Frequency/ 

Frequency 

for North Sea 

1.0 

.2 

.05 

1.4 

.03 

.9 

0 

.10 

.05 

Weighted
 
Relative
 
Frequency
 
2.5
 
1.4
 
1.275
 
5.46
 
0.123
 
1.62
 
0
 
.65
 
.16
 
the North Sea 10.688
World Multiplying Factor Relative to 2.5
 
Reference: (1) U.S. Navy,Marine 
1 March 1969. 
Climatic Atlas of the World,Navair 50-lC-54, 
(2) U.S. Department of Agriculture, Weather Bureau Atlas of Climatic 
Charts of the Oceans, 1938. 
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Table 6.5 Offshore Oil Weather Weighting
 
Weather
 
Production Relative Production
 
Region Weather Factor Weight
 
Southern North Sea 3.9 1.0 0.039
 
Northern North Sea 32.0 1.4 0.448
 
Gulf of Mexico 5.5 0.2 0.011
 
Venezuela 14.0 
 0.05 0.007
 
Bass Straits 2.1 1.4 0.029
 
South China Sea 2.3 0.03 0.001
 
Gulf of Alaska 1.0 0.9 0.009
 
Persian Gulf 20.0 0 0
 
West Africa 3.5 0.1 0.004
 
California 3.9 
 0.05 0.002
 
World (rough) 2.9 1.0 0.029
 
World (smooth) 8.9 0 0
 
= 0.579 
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As a percentage of production, based on a 1985 pro­
duction of 
25.5 million barrels per day, one million barrels
 
per day is about 3.9 percent. Changes to Table 6.4 are in­
troduced 	to reflect the expectations from the southern and
 
northern North Sea and California. Other world producing
 
regions are assumed to produce incrementally by a factor of
 
1.4, a growth at 3-1/2 percent per annum for ten years. To
 
complete the percentage distribution, the nonregionally account­
ed percentage, 11.8 percent, is 
split 25 percent into world
 
rough and 75 
percent into world smooth with factors for the
 
weather of 1 and 0. Weather weightings also reflect reason­
ably well the occurrence of storms which are 
significant to
 
exploratory drillings. The derived value of 0.579 is 
conser­
vative within the technique employed because it is based on
 
total production and 
not incremental production. To define an
 
alternative weighting factor, up 
to 2,000, assuming the north­
ern North Sea production remains essentially constant beyond
 
1985, the weight for the northern North Sea, 0.448, will be
 
multiplied by the average regional relative weather factor of
 
0.51 to give a weight for its uniform distribution of 0.228.
 
A benefit weight due 
to weather that would be reasonable from
 
1985 to 2000 would then lie between 0.579 and 0.359.
 
6.4 	 Weather Adjusted Annual Benefit
 
The total unadjusted annual benefit 
was estimated to
 
be $658 million.
 
88
 
It is estimated that a reasonable weather adjust­
ment factor for the world's offshore oil production between
 
1985 and 2000 would be between 0.359 and 0.579. Hence, the
 
adjustment annual benefit to the offshore oil and gas indus­
try will range from $236 million to $381 million.
 
6.5 	 Weather Adjusted Annual Benefit Exclusive to
 
SiEASAT
 
In the study of Coastal Zones, a judgmental esti­
mate was made of the influence of an operational SEASAT's
 
data on models that would be used for prediction, in particular
 
of coastal zone storminess.* The matrix of influence is 
re­
produced in Table 6.6. From this matrix and from experience
 
with modeling*, judgmentally estimated benefits to SEASAT to
 
be 30 percent of the essentially potential benefits within an
 
operation.
 
Such a judgmental factor seems reasonable for this
 
application also. Hence, it is suggested that the annual
 
benefit from offshore oil and gas which are exclusive to
 
SEASAT will range from $71 million to $114 million.
 
6.6 	 The Uncertainty in the Calculated Benefits
 
In an industry such as the offshore oil and gas
 
industry which is in 1975 at a very volatile state of develop­
ment, considerable uncertainty exists in trying to project
 
what will happen 25 year hence.
 
* 
Econ, Inc., SEASAT Economic Assessment. Vol.V,
 
Coastal Zones-Case Study and Generalization, 1975.
 
Table 6.6 Model Influence for SEASAT Measurements
 
SEASAT Measurement
 
Surface Surface Atmosphere 

Model 
 Winds Waves Profiles Topography 

Marine Wind Analysis Model 4 0 0 0 

PE Atmospheric Forecast Model 3 2 4 0 

Ocean Circulation Model 4 2 0 4 

Hydrodynamic Numerical Models 4 0 0 3 

Surface Current Models 4 3 0 4 

Thermal Structure Models 1 3 0 2 

[feat Exchange Models 4 0 3 0 

Spectral wave Models 4 4 3 0 

Ocean Tidal Models 0 0 0 3 

4 0 -0
Dispersion/Diffusion Models 4 

0 0
Search and Rescue Models 4 4 

Ocean Front Models 3 1 0 3 

Acoustic Propagation Models 0 4 0 0 

Storm Surge Models 4 3 0 3 

Surf Models 0 4 0 

Code: 4 Critical Direct Influence
 
3 Major Direct Influence
 
2 Minor Direct Influence
 
1 Slight Direct Influence
 
0 No Influence 

Surface 

Temperature 

2 

3 

3 

0 

3 

4 

4 

1 

0 

3 

3 

4 

4 

0 

Sea
 
Ice
 
1
 
1
 
1
 
1
 
1
 
1
 
0
 
1
 
0
 
0
 
2
 
0
 
2
 
0
 
1
 
00 
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Some quantitative measure of uncertainty can be
 
made by considering the range of drilling rigs and their
 
growth characteristics that have been suggested in the liter­
ature. At the low end it can be considered that new construc­
tion will just maintain the rig fleet at 300 until 1985 at
 
which time it will naturally decay at the rate of ten rigs
 
per annum. At the high end new construction will be emphasized
 
to create a rig fleet of 1,000 in 1985 after which the fleet
 
size will decay at the rate of ten per annum.
 
This uncertainty produces changes both in anticipated
 
production and the average annual size of the rig fleet.
 
These changes, then can be used to determine the magnitude of
 
uncertainty in the benefits as shown in Table 6.7.
 
The weather adjusted annual benefit, with uncertain­
ty, can range from $97 million to $553 million, with a most
 
likely annual benefit ranging from $236 million to $381 million.
 
The estimated annual benefit to SEASAT, with uncer­
tainty can range from $29 million to $166 million with a most
 
likely annual benefit ranging from $71 million to $114 million.
 
The benefit uncertainty, as related to the size of the
 
world's drilling rig fleet, is in some manner a measure of the
 
relationship among the price of oil, the various worldwide
 
leasing agreements and the general ability to keep exploitation
 
costs within reasonable bounds as a consequence of improved
 
technology and its relatively precise application to the
 
operations to be performed. This relationship at this time is
 
either too complex or too tenuous to unravel.
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Table 6.7 Benefit Uncertainty Calculations (1985-2000)
 
1985 rig fleet 300 700 1000 
1975 production mb/d 10 10 10 
1985 production mb/d* 21.6 (27.7) 25.5 (32.7) 28.5 (36.5) 
2000 production mb/d* 45.9 (35.3) 78.1 (60.1) 103.3 (79.5) 
Production increment 
by 1985 mb/d 11.6 15.5 18.5 
Production increment 
1985-2000 mb/d 24.3 52.6 74.8 
% incremental production 
1985-2000 mb/d 46.2 100 142.2 
Average annual number 
of rigs 1985-2000 225 625 925 
% number of rigs 1985-2000 36.0 100 148 
Unadjusted annual benefit to
 
production ($ million) 147.1 318.3 452.6
 
Unadjusted annual benefit to
 
rigs ($ million) 122.2 339.4 502.3
 
Total unadjusted annual benefit
 
($ million) 269.3 657.7 954.9
 
Weather adjusted annual benefit
 
range ($ million) 97-i56 236-381 343-553
 
SEASAT exclusive annual benefit
 
range ($ million) 29-47 71-114 103-166
 
*Parentheses identify the percentages of expected world oil production.
 
In 1985 this is estimated to be 78 mb/d; in 2000, 130 mb/d.
 
1' 
/
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6.7 Integrated Benefits
 
The annual benefit ranges, with uncertainty, have been
 
identified. To determine the integrated benefit over 
time,
 
each annual benefit for each given year is discounted from
 
the given year back to 1975 at some appropriate interest rate.
 
In this study benefits are assumed to be accumulated only at
 
the end of the year 1985 and henceforward to the end of the
 
year 2000. Annual benefits are then discounted to the
 
beginning of 1975. 
 The first annual benefit discounting time
 
period is therefore 11 
years and the last is 26 years. Annual
 
benefits, equal each year, are then simply multiplied by an
 
integrated discount factor which depends 
on the interest rate
 
used.
 
The multiplying factors to the annual benefit, as a
 
function 	of interest rate, are shown below.
 
Interest 	rate 0% 5% 
 10% 15%
 
Factor 	 16 6.7073 3.0162 
 1.4716
 
The integrated benefit as a function of discount 
rate is
 
tabulated in Table 6.7.
 
6.8 	 An Independent Study of Oil in the Canadian Arctic
 
In the Arctic regions all activities and operations
 
necessary to oil production and transportation are strongly
 
influenced by the presence of 
ice, either as icebergs in
 
motion or as pack ice formation pressure ridge existence,
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depth and frequency, as well as the 
more familiar sea con­
dition and weather parameters common to 
other regions of the
 
world.
 
This independent specialized study of Canadian Arctic
 
oil, is not based on operational data and is not therefore
 
a case study. It is inclined in the generalization, for its
 
documentation of 
the difficulties inherent in the oil pros­
pecting and production projection, at this time and in this
 
region, and to show an 
independent estimate of 
regional bene­
fits.
 
The requirement to 
seek operational effectiveness in
 
the ice environment clearly depends on the degree of
 
compatibility and adaptability that operational equipment and
 
procedures 
can provide as a result of appropriate knowledge
 
of the time-varying characteristics of all forms of 
ice. Few
 
of these characteristics are currently available on 
the scale
 
that is necessary to comprehensive planning both of equipment
 
design or 
selection and of the operations themselves.
 
Operational costs are therefore difficult to predict and
 
investment risk is 
great, factors which tend 
to constrain
 
movement toward expansion of 
the development of the considerable
 
Arctic resources estimated to be present.
 
The collection of environmental data and 
its reduction
 
are a necessary preamble to the structuring of research,
 
development and technique programs that will result in 
an
 
optimum compatability and adaptability 
in the operating
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environment of that which is needed to produce and transport
 
the oil. When the equipment and operating procedures have
 
been carefully selected, of necessity their effective
 
functioning will depend on a variety of forecasting requirements
 
related to the ice, the weather and the 
sea state.
 
The area of the regions involved is vast; consequently
 
satellite observation is ideally suited 
to the task, although
 
not exclusively so 
because of possible local limitation of
 
satellite-borne instrumentations. Thus locally other
 
observational sensors may be necessary, airborne or helicopter
 
borne. All sensors must however be as 
close to all-weather
 
operational as possible, and the weather involved is both
 
fog and a wide range of precipitation densities, from light
 
rain to heavy snow. Thus, there is a requirement for micro­
wave frequency remote sensors 
such as those that SEASAT will
 
provide.
 
Potentially,therefore, SEASAT 
can be very beneficial
 
to Arctic offshore and coastal oil prospecting, providing
 
data from which functional forms of compatible equipment and
 
operations can be constructed and data which will minimize
 
avoidable economic losses during operations with this
 
equipment. Very importantly also, a systematic approach to
 
exploiting the Arctic resources, which SEASAT can contribute
 
to, can reduce the impact of Arctic operations on the natural
 
environment, limiting ecological interference."
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The case studies reported so far, based purely
 
on sea located operations have only a 
tenuous relationship
 
with Arctic operations. 
 Arctic oil production was not ex­
plicitly evaluated and was implicitly subsumed under 
the
 
heading of 
'world rough' in modeling estimation. (p. 78)
 
The data in this study is specialized to the
 
Canadian Arctic 
and the benefit estimates therefrom have
 
been provided specifically by the Canada Centre for Remote
 
Sensing, Ottawa,_ Ontario, Canada.
 
The study addresses activity on a regional basis;
 
the Canadian East Coast, Beaufort Sea, 
Arctic Islands,
 
Davis Str&it-Baffin Bay and Hudson Bay and for each of these
 
regions, where possible, benefits to remote 
sensing are
 
developed, for different phases of oil production activities.
 
Some suggested benefits arise, based 
on Arctic activity, 
before 1985 -- the earliest expected time for an operational
 
SEASAT. The achievement of these benefits is 
therefore
 
doubtful.
 
Because of the 
involvement of multinational corpor­
ations, and the complexities of contract work, it is 
not clear
 
what portion of the benefits would be related directly to oper­
ations of Canadian companies. 
 Nor is it clear whether the
 
gross benefits to foreign companies would be reflected as Ca­
nadian benefits through adjusted prices, royalties, tax levies
 
or government service charges.
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6.8.1 Summary of Benefits
 
Benefits of remote sensing to Canadian Arctic
 
offshore petroleum exploration and production are potentially
 
large and estimates of the value of 
ideal ice and weather
 
information have ranged up 
to ten percent of total costs.
 
For those limited, more easily quantifiable benefit areas
 
looked at, 
benefits from forecasting environmental conditions
 
to daily operations tended to fall in the 3-4 percent range.
 
It has been difficult to quantify many economic benefits how­
ever, because of speculation about technology 
to be used in
 
the development and production phase and the 
general lack of
 
experience to date in all phases 
of petroleum production ac­
tivities in ice infested waters. 
 The economic importance of
 
scheduling can be expected to greatly increase 
as activities
 
progress into the production phase. 
 In the final analysis,
 
benefits from remote 
sensing assisted improvements in ice and
 
weather forecasting may be largest in promoting safe opera­
tions and reducing environmental damage., The risks to wild­
life are great in areas such as the Beaufort Sea and in
 
Lancaster Sound where drilling will be done in 2,500 feet of
 
water.
 
Table 6.8 presents a 
summary of some of the economic
 
benefits to 
the Canadian Arctic offshore petroleum industry.
 
It shows potential gross benefits of $31.2 million in 
1981
 
rising to $47.6 million in 1985 and decreasing to $25.8
 
million in 1990. If only 50 
percent of these benefits were
 
Remote Sensing Systems to Canadian
Table 6.8 	 Potential Gross Benefits of 

Arctic Offshore Petroleum Production (All fiqures in $ millions)
 
Arctic Islands affinl Bay - Davis Strait
 
Ottabore East Coast Beaufort Sea Offshore Offshore
 
Platforms
 
Exploration Development

Exploration Development Exploration Development and Exploration Development 
 Wells Total
 
Wells Wells Wells Pipelines Wells Wells Wells 
Year Wells 

5.4 	 21.2-36.6
3.6
6.0 	 16.2-21.6
1981 

9.2 47.6-50.4
7.2- 9.6 7.2 2.0-2.4 2.3 4.4 3.0 
1985 2.4 9.9 

3.8 25.8-27.0
3.6- 4.8 3.6 0.5 1.8 2.4 2.1 
1990 1.2 6.8 

Lo 
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achieved in 1990 with a system including a SEASAT or equiv­
alent operational satellite system, benefits of $12.9 to
 
$13.5 million per year would result.
 
The current SEASAT planning does not envisage an
 
operational SEASAT before 1985. For this reason, the bene­
fits prior to 1985 shown in Table 6.9 are not included in
 
the estimation of SEASAT benefits
 
The benefits to SEASAT from Arctic o~fshore oil
 
operations are assumed to be $47.6 million in 1985, declining
 
to $25.8 million in 1990.
 
Assuming that the benefits estimated decline
 
linearly with time at a rate of $4.4 million per annum, there
 
will be no benefits beyond 1995. The integrated undiscounted
 
benefit from 1985 onward will then be about $282 
million.
 
In the modeling procedure, from which a generalization
 
was produced, the total annual unadjusted benefit derived was
 
7 5 
.)
$657.7 million.. (See 6.3, p. 

Weighting this for weather, assuming world (rough)
 
was an estimate for the Arctic regions. would allocate about
 
3 percent of this benefit to this region annually, i.e., about
 
$18.7 million per annum from 1985 to 2000. Thus the integrated
 
benefit from the model would be about $299 million, for the
 
Arctic region in general rather than just for the Canadian
 
Arctic.
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Table 6.9 Integrated Benefits from Improved Ocean
 
Weather Forecasts to Offshore Oil and Gas
 
Industry Production and Exploratory Drill­
ing (1985-2000)
 
Annual
Di'scount rate 0% 5% 10% 15%,
 
SEASAT
 
exclusive
 
benefit 464 - 2656 195 - 1113 87 
- 501 43 - 244
 
range
 
$ million
 
SEASAT
 
exclusive
 
most
 
likely 1136 - 1824 476 - 765 214 344- 104 - 168 
benefit 
range 
$ million 
Range of
 
benefit
 
from all
 
forecasting 1547 - 8853 650 ­ 3710 290 - 1670 143 - 813 
sources 
$ million 
Most likely
 
range of
 
benefits
 
from all 3787 6080
- 1587 - 2550 713 - 1147 347 - 560 
forecasting
 
sources
 
$ million
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It is 
possible that the model's allocation to world
 
(rough) is not sufficiently large, yet both the Canadian
 
estimates 
and the model's estimates are dependent on the
 
conjectured oil production from the 
'rough' regions of the
 
world. This production must 
compete in the world markets with
 
the production from world 
(smooth) which essentially appears
 
capable of providing oil at much less 
overall investment cost.
 
The Canadian estimates 
and those from the model differ
 
in the time period at which benefits will accrue to 
a
 
satellite capable of providing the remote sensing data
 
necessary for Arctic ice operations. Thus the Canadian
 
discounted benefits will be higher than those from the model
 
used in 	this generalization.
 
Overall however, considering the differences of
 
approach and the considerable difficulties in projection of
 
the regional distribution of offshore oil production, the 
two
 
results are in reasonable agreement with respect 
to the
 
expected undiscounted benefit, in a conservative manner.
 
6.8.2 Study Results
 
Benefits are developed and discussed on 
a regional
 
basis according to available data and the regional
 
peculiarities with respect 
to ice influences on different
 
phases of offshore oil operations.
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6.8.3 East Coast Offshore
 
6.8.3.1 Exploratory Drilling
 
Approximately $365 million has been spent on east
 
coast offshore exploration. One hundred and six exploratory
 
wells have been drilled to the end of 1974 in search of
 
estimated reserves of 47.5 billion barrels of oil and 307
 
trillion cubic feet of gas.* Major focus of exploration
 
interest has shifted from the Scotian shelf and Grand
 
Banks where significant commercial discoveries have not
 
been made and little action is expected in the near future
 
(possibly one rig operating). The Labrador Sea, however,
 
shows considerable promise particularly for gas. Impressive
 
gas discoveries have been made here in two of three wildcats
 
drilled by Eastcan in 1973 and 1974. Information is not
 
adequate to make valid reserve estimates (although one partner
 
published an estimate of 21 billion barrels of oil).**
 
The total world fleet (three) of dypo self-positioning
 
drillships are to be used here in the summer of 1975.
 
These drillships cost $S0,000 to $100,000 per day to operate.
 
6.8.3.2 Problems Encountered in Drilling Operations
 
The iceberg infested waters lying off Canada's east
 
*Oilweek, February 17, 1975, p. 49.
 
**Ibid., p. 74.
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coast and covering her continental shelf from the Grand
 
Banks north to Ellesmere Island present severe problems
 
for the offshore petroleum industry. The problems are es­
pecially acute in the Labrador Sea and the constant danger
 
of icebergs colliding with fixed installations diminishes
 
almost at the same time as the weather gets too rough for
 
drillships. This results in a short working season, ex­
tending from June when the Labrador pack ice breaks up to
 
possibly mid-October when weather conditions become very
 
bad.
 
There are numerous examples of operational delays
 
caused by iceberg, weather or pack-ice threats. For exam­
ple, in January 1973 a well was spudded 215 miles east of
 
the Avalon Penninsula of Newfoundland. Ice moved in just
 
after the well was spudded and the drilling rig had to be
 
moved. The work had to be redone later at a loss of
 
$200,000. bperations would not have been started had it
 
been known that there was an ice threat in the area. East­
can's Pelican and B.P.'s Havdrill, the two dynamically
 
positioned vessels operating in the Labrador Sea in 1974,
 
both experienced difficulties. "The Pelican spent 50 per­
cent of its time off hole in October waiting for weather
 
or dodging icebergs. It drilled and tested the successful
 
Gudrid well, losing one of its main propellers to drift
 
ice."* B.P.'s Havdrill "dodged bergs going south and
 
*Oilweek, February 15, 1975, p. 74.
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would often dodge the same bergs going north the following
 
day." A total of 12.6 days were spent in 1974 waiting be­
cause of ice and weather. When the ship left in the fall,
 
it had left its BOP (blow off preventer) stack and 8,000
 
feet of drillpipe on the seafloor as a result of a storm.*
 
This problem cost B.P. about $2 million in rig damage and
 
work lost in 1974. The Havdrill is scheduled to return
 
earily (June 15) to finish the well,. The company is pre­
pared to spend two weeks to repair damage and get back on
 
the well makivg a probable total loss of $3-$4 million.
 
Already the well has cost $8 million and this one problem
 
could cost more than ten percent of total expenditures to
 
date for the four wells drilled in this area.
 
These examples illustrate the environmental pro­
blems faced in this offshore area. Icebergs almost prohi­
bit the use of conventional anchored semisubmersibles which
 
are more stable and could wotk later in the season--"An
 
Eastcan official speculated if a semi had been on the job
 
last year, it would have been constantly disconnected ex­
cept toward the end of October when it could have continued
 
while rough weather chased the floaters away"** (Ref. 5).
 
*Ibid., December 16, 1975, p. 59.
 
**Ibid., February 17, 1975, p. 74.
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While the dynamically positioned ships have berg-tracking radar
 
on board and can disconnect in a few minutes, they may still
 
require air reconnaissance information on bergs during
 
certain critical periods when iceberg-free "time windows"
 
and calm sea conditions are required to carry out certain
 
operations. These periods include the initial drilling
 
period, a period when the crew are running casing to protect
 
the well, and the flow-testing period. Iceberg-free
 
conditions required may be one to three days depending on the
 
operation.
 
Pack ice in the open sea in many ways is a more
 
formidable problem than icebergs and when both icebergs and
 
pack ice are present, operations may be impossible. Pack-ice
 
surveillance is important particularly at the beginning of
 
the season and will become more important at the 'end if rigs
 
are designed to cope with fall weather conditions. Any
 
extension of the short drilling season would have economic
 
value.
 
Sea state and weather forecasts are essential
 
throughout the drilling season and become especially critical
 
in the fall. There are examples of operational shutdowns
 
because of storm forecasts which did not materialize or did
 
not as early or to the degree anticipated. Rig operators
 
generally operate conservatively. Examples were found of
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unnecessary delays up to 
three days because of forecasted
 
impending high winds and waves which did not 
materialize.
 
For example, a rig might disconnect fearing wave heights
 
would get dangerous but although they didn't, the sea Was
 
too rough for repositioning which requires calm waters. On
 
the other hand there are examples such as that of the Hav­
drill mentioned above, when either sifficient warning is not
 
given or operators do not have sufficient faith in the fore­
cast. General weather forecasts are received from shore sta­
tions 100 or more 
miles away and these may be quite inaccur­
ate as to local conditions.
 
The east coast region is cloud covered most of the
 
time with frequent dense fog. These conditions make micro­
wave sensing essential. The icgberg-tracking radars (range
 
16-18 mile) on board the rigs have helped considerably, al­
though difficulties are still experienced detecting some
 
bergs, particularly growlers and bergs of certain geometries
 
which become lost in the sea clutter. (Amoco has not been
 
as successful using these radars in local surveillance as
 
B.P. and Eastcan.)
 
6.8.3.3 Data Requirements
 
The most severe new problem encountered by off­
shore drilling crews is icebergs. The detailed drift
 
patterns of icebergs have not received much attention and
 
now become extremely important to fixed operations. Iceberg
 
motion is related to wind, wind driven currents, and changes in
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6.8.3.4 Remote Sensing Benefits
 
Remote sensing providing all-weather reconnais­
sance of ice and icebergs, wave heights, surface winds and
 
temperatures may provide benefits to offshore drilling
 
operations in the following ways:
 
1. 	 Extension of season
 
Benefits may be obtained at both the begin­
ning and end of the season. Historical data is particu­
larly valuable here. For example, the Havdrill is to ar­
rive on the Labrador coast June 15, 1975 and B.P. expects
 
the Pelican to start drilling the first half of July and
 
the Sedco 445 in the second half.* Historical data on ice,
 
wave and weather which is limited at the moment could help
 
in determining in what locations drilling can start ear­
lier, and what is the likely optimum time for a given
 
location.
 
A very significant prolonging of the season
 
into the fall is probable but environmental data is ex­
tremely limited during this rough water period. Informa­
tion on wave heights and winds is needed. For example,
 
Eastcan representatives have indicated that the season in
 
the Labrador Sea could possibly be extended from mid-Octo­
ber into December but "nobody knows the weather". Bene­
fits would arise from fixed costs, e.g., mobilization and
 
demobilization, spread over a longer working season.
 
Consider extension of a season by one month, e.g., from
 
*Globe and Mail, April 17, 1975, p. B-14.
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90 days to 120 days. A fixed cost of $1 million is probable.
 
(This is variable depending on where the rig and supply ves­
sels, iceberg towing vessels, helicopters, etc. have to be
 
moved from.) Spreading these fixed costs over the extended
 
season would result in a benefit of $330,000.
 
A much shorter extension of season (perhaps on­
ly two to three days) might make the difference of completion
 
of a well or having to return to it at the beginning of the
 
following year. This is particularly true in the Labrador
 
Sea area where "approximately" two wells may be drilled in
 
a three to four month period, but the second may not quite
 
be completed. The benefit here could be one to two days
 
operating time or approximately $100,000 to $200,000. Of
 
the four wells drilled in this area for example, the Havdrill
 
will return to complete Bonaventure in 1975 and the Pelican
 
in 1974 returned to test the Bjarn-i well drilled in 1973.
 
Without statistical data on ice conditions built
 
up over several years, there is also the possibility of
 
bringing in a rig before it is possible to start drilling.
 
In 1974 the Havdrill had to wait three days for pack ice to
 
clear before it could start operations. A rig sitting idle
 
for one week would cost about $400,000. (Although conditions
 
in ice-infested waters can change from year to year, clearly
 
environmental and economic benefits will result from baseline
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data collected throughout these offshore areas, including
 
many areas in which the possibility of substantial future
 
activity appears remote at the moment.)
 
An extended reliable weather forecast could have
 
significant benefits near the end of the season. For
 
example,a decision to cease operations rather than wait could
 
result from a forecast which indicated weather would be
 
unfavorable for operations for at least four or five days.
 
As experimental modeling using SEASAT-type data is now being
 
done, such forecasts may become possible. A saving of
 
$400,000 would result in the above illustration, assuming the
 
decision to cease the season's operations would otherwise
 
just be delayed.
 
2. Wildcat drilling site location may be affected by
 
historical data on ice, icebergs, weather and waves. Where
 
other factors are equal it is probable there are areas more
 
suitable than others where iceberg encroachment, for example,
 
may be slightly less probable. while this data certainly
 
would not affect location of all wells, it could be very
 
beneficial for possibly one out of four wells, resulting in
 
savings of one to two days or $25,000 to $50,000 on average
 
per well.
 
3. Substantial benefits can be expected from daily
 
reconnaissance and forecasting of ice, iceberg and wave
 
conditions. Iceberg reconnaissance will be particularly
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important in choosing the iceberg-free "windows" discussed
 
earlier. 
 Fog or storms may make it difficult with other
 
than microwave remote sensing. 
Frequent surveillance gives
 
information on how fast ice 
is forming and drifting and how
 
icebergs are drifting permitting a long lead time for
 
ongoing or 
better planning. Such reconnaissance on an on­
going basis combined with on-site observations will optimize
 
operational efficiency. An average saving per well of 12-24
 
hours in this area due to improved ice and iceberg surveill­
ance and one to two 
days due to improved wave and weather
 
forecasts is probable. amounts to
This $150-$300 thousand
 
per well. (An Amoco official felt that two-days saving per
 
hold for iceberg reconnaissance, only even with current on­
site radar, was very conservative.) B.P. officials indicated
 
they have had good success in iceberg-infested areas with
 
their quick release capability and on-site radar, helicopter
 
and tow ship. Forecast of a rough sea causing a ship to pull
 
its marine riser system may force 
a wait of perhaps three days
 
or even a week till the 
sea becomes very calm for repositioning.
 
This could represent a large loss if a hazardous 
sea state did
 
not develop because drilling can continue in sea states much
 
rougher than the calm waters 
required for repositioning.
 
4. Design optimization benefits may also result.
 
For example, drilling in the deeper water 
area off Labrador is
 
ill
 
expected in the late 1970s 
or early 1980s and questions of
 
mobility (because of icebergs) and stability (because of sea
 
state) must be answered.
 
5. Benefits may result from reduced damage to drill­
ships. The Pelican cost $50 million to build and dypo
 
(dynamically positioned) ships currently building come close
 
to $80 million.* Without accurate prediction of impending
 
high wave and wind conditions and iceberg drift, not only will
 
unnecessary movements off-site take place, but also the possi­
bility of failure to move when necessary arises. Insurance
 
rates are high in an environment more hostile than the North
 
Sea. Here, during the winter months of 1973 alone, 
(about
 
30 rigs operating) insurance reimbursement of $35 million in
 
damages was paid. This covered the total loss of one large
 
rig and repairs resulting from substantial wind damage to
 
other drilling structures.**
 
The safe conduct of marine resupply operations is
 
dependent on good wave, weather and ice information. Storm
 
and fog information is essential for helicopter operations.
 
Freezing spray forecasting required by both supply
 
vessels and rigs may be improved using remote sensing data
 
which provides sea surface winds
state, and temperature
 
Oilweek, February 17, 1975, p. 76.
 
ECON, Inc., SEASAT Economic Assessment, October
 
1974, p. 8-8.
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data. There will be no spray-induced icing where there is
 
heavy pack ice.*
 
6. Environmental data,both real time and historical,
 
would reduce duplication of data gathering by petroleum
 
companies which,due to competitiveness,may not fully share
 
data.
 
Companies are faced with the problem of exploring
 
a huge block of permits in a limited period. Improved
 
environmental data will mean that they can do this more
 
safely and will not have to "cut expensive corners" to meet
 
permit time constraints.
 
It is important to note that benefits of improved
 
information from remotely sensed data occur in a variety of
 
ways and not all of those indicated would apply or be
 
realized for a particular well. Moreover the principal areas
 
of benefits can be expected to change with technology advances
 
and lengthening of the working season. (This is already
 
evident with the dynamically positioned ships currently
 
handling the iceberg problem much better than was the case for
 
the first east coast offshore drilling.) Currently, exploratory
 
drilling is done only during the ideal summer period. If the
 
initial successes in the Labrador Sea continue, it is
 
probable companies will attempt to extend the season.
 
*Energy Communications, Inc., "Arctic Offshore Problems
 
Examined," Offshore Technology Yearbook, 1974.
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Technology advances will be made, e.g. dynamically positioned
 
semisubmersibles which can withstand high waves and winds,
 
will probably be available in several years.* (The daily
 
operating cost can be expected to increase.) In spite
 
of these advances, as the working season is pushed into
 
the more unpredictable and more hazardous storm and pack-ice
 
seasons, the need for excellent reconnaissance and forecasting
 
can be expected to increase rather than diminish.
 
Adding up the benefits given above, the saving per
 
well due to reliable ice surveillance and weather forecasting
 
and the collection of baseline data amounts to about $200,000
 
$400,000 per exploratory well or on average about 4 percent
 
of the well cost. (This is considered conservative taking
 
into account opinions ranging to ten percent mentioned earlier
 
and considering incidents such as the 1974 Havdrill experience
 
costing about ten percent of total costs for four Labrador Sea
 
wells drilled to date.) Benefits would come from such areas
 
as reduction of "false alarms" causing pulling of the marine
 
riser system and accidents due to sudden storms.
 
Although the schedule for well drilling is highly
 
uncertain and depends on many factors including success rate,
 
petroleum production estimates supplied by one company
 
suggest that possibly a maximum of 20 per year will be
 
reached by 1981 and decrease thereafter to about six per
 
year by 1986 and four per year by 1990.
 
*Oilweek, February 17, 1975, p. 49.
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Remote sensing benefits to east coast exploratory
 
drilling could therefore, in theory, rise to a maximum of
 
$6 million in 1981 if optimum data collection systems and
 
appropriate communications systems and weather forecasting
 
models were in place, dropping thereafter to about $1.8
 
million in 1986 and decreasing thereafter. No attempt will
 
be made to forecast what percentage of this is realizable, as
 
several factors and systems are involved. With appropriate
 
systems in place, it is estimated that SEASAT or equivalent
 
microwave sensing operational systems could provide a gross
 
benefit of $600,000 in 1990.
 
6.8.3.5 Development and Production Phase
 
Although technical problems because of environmental
 
conditions are bad in the exploratory drilling phase, they
 
become more severe in the development and production phase.
 
During this phase the level of activity increases considerably.
 
Instead of a few rigs drilling wildcat wells during the best
 
weather period, considerably expanded drilling activity will
 
take place, as well as construction of gathering and
 
processing plants, oil storage and tanker terminals and either
 
seabed gas pipelines or an LNG terminal. Work will be carried
 
out in an extended season and ice and weather surveillance
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and prediction must be excellent to maximize the length of the
 
operating season and daily operating efficiency.
 
The production phase is by far the most expensive--more
 
than 86 percent of the total expenditure in an example by
 
Cazenove and Company.*
 
The solution to environmental hazards in the exploratory
 
phase has been dynamically positioned drillships with
 
automatic pipe handling which may get off the well quickly.
 
Since fixed structures are unlikely in the Labrador Sea, a
 
similar type of vessel will likely be used in development
 
drilling. The cost per well may be slightly less than for
 
exploratory, i.e., probably 50 days x $100,000.
 
The desire to have a long operating season may result
 
in sacrificing something in time required to disconnect for
 
more stability in handling fall storm conditions.
 
Anchored semisubmersibles would require about one-day
 
warning of a potential problem and would require one to two
 
days to get back on the well and set the anchors. Development
 
of dynamically positioned semisubmersibles is being considered,
 
as mentioned previously.
 
Ice-breaking type vessels are also being considered
 
which could stand up to some ice and would double the operating
 
season.** The operating cost would also double to about
 
$200,000 per day. Icebergs and heavy seas would still cause
 
shutdown or disconnect from the well.
 
* Cazenove & Company, "The Search for Oil and Gas and 
the Implications for Investment,' London, 1972, p. 49.
 
**Oilweek, February 17, 1975, p. 76.
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This system could require one-half to two days to get
 
back into operation after disconnecting, depending on whether
 
it was anchored or self-positioning. It is possible that a
 
self-propelled production platform will be used with ability
 
to maintain its position until threatened by an untowable
 
iceberg (more than I million tons) or heavy pack ice and then
 
move off (protective structures such is a network of wires
 
anchored to the seabed may also reduce frequency of' disconnect)
 
Generally iceberg hazards may be handled by deflecting the berg
 
away from installations, designing the installations to
 
withstand possible impacts or to move out of the path, or
 
locating the operation in a safe place.)
 
In view of accessibility of oil tankers to the area
 
and the potential threat of iceberg scouring to seabed
 
pipelines, a floating storage vessel costing possibly
 
$50 million either anchored or self-positioned is probable and
 
would cast off under severe ice or iceberg threat. Historical
 
data will help in determining the optimum system, how fast
 
it must move off, etc.
 
6.8.3.6 Remote Sensing Benefits
 
In spite of improved and developing technology, similar
 
types of benefits from remotely sensed data can be expected in
 
the development drilling phase as in the exploratory phase.
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These will include making use of an optimum length of working
 
season and reducing unproductive time by good ice and sea
 
state surveillance and forecasting. 
This data becomes critical
 
outside the fair weather period. Savings per well for
 
unproductive days (one and one-half 
to three days) of $150,000
 
to $300,000 are estimated with pack-ice surveillance assuming
 
a greater importance than before (because of the extended
 
season). Weather forecasts become more important for resupply
 
operations in this extended season
 
Historical data on iceberg statistics in a given
 
location can affect the concept of the production system. If a
 
floating storage system is 
used, this data would provide
 
information as to the frequency and speed with which the vessel
 
would have to move out 
of the way and what defense structures
 
would be required. A difference in design cost (possibly as
 
much as five to ten percent or $2.5 to $5 million on a
 
$50 million structure) could result. The same information
 
is vital for sea bottom pipeline gathering systems where
 
scouring hazards exist and a ruptured line from a single
 
well could result in loss of production of 10,000 barrels
 
a day or $25,000 of oil per day for possibly two weeks.
 
A seabed facility will have to be protected from the
 
iceberg scouring hazard while a surface storage facility will
 
have the pack ice as its major problem. If a storage facility
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has to be moved frequently, continuity of supply may be
 
affected. The safety of transfer of oil from a storage vessel
 
to a tanker depends on environmental conditions which must be
 
monitored and forecasted. Clearly excellent data is required,
 
both historical for design and reconnaissance for operatrions,to
 
avoid severe environmental and economic penalties. It is
 
assumed that development drilling will commence in 1982,subject
 
to government approval, and that construction of gathering
 
systems, processing plants, storage and tanker terminals will
 
take place in the 1982-1986 timeframe.
 
Using (perhaps optimistic-) production estimates of
 
1.05 million barrels of oil per day and 2,800 million
 
cubic feet per day of gas by 1990, it is estimated that gas
 
and oil development drilling will increase to a maximum of
 
44 wells drilled in 1984 and decrease thereafter to 30 in 1990.
 
Remote sensing benefits of $150,000 to $300,000 per
 
well or, on average, $225,000 would, in theory, give benefits of
 
$6.3 million in 1982 rising to $9.9 million in 1984, dropping
 
to 
about $6.8 million in 1990 and thereafter decreasing. An
 
operational SEASAT or equivalent system with ancillary
 
communication systems and models in place is estimated to
 
achieve 50 percent of these benefits by 1990.
 
The benefits given above do not include other
 
production phase benefits including weather and ice information
 
119
 
during construction of gathering and processing plants,
 
storage facilities, pipelines and tanker terminals. Also
 
not included are benefits, both economic and safety, to re­
supply operations and to design of structures and scheduling.
 
6.8.4 Beaufort Sea
 
6.8.4.1 Exploratory Drilling
 
Exploratory drilling in the Mackenzie Delta
 
offshore area has been from artificial islands. Imperial
 
Oil has had oil strikes at Imik and Adgo. The first step
 
out on Imperial's Adgo field has been a success, and indus­
try speculation has the field potential in the 750 million
 
barrel category.* Exploratory drilling will commence in
 
the Beaufort Sea in 1976 where a $5 million environmental
 
study was started in 1974 (and is being continued in 1975)
 
and reserve estimates have been given as ten billion bar­
rels of oil and 75 trillion cubic feet of gas.** First
 
plans were to move two specially designed floating drill­
ships into the Beaufort area during the 1975 navigation
 
season and to winter them there so the permitted drilling
 
project could begin early in the open water season of 1976.
 
Because of construction delays, the ships are to be brought
 
around Point Barrow as soon as ice conditions permit in
 
1976.***
 
*Oilweek, April 14, 1975, p. 5.
 
**Ibid., February 3, 1975, p. 9.
 
***"Canmar Plans Summar Environment Program," The
 
Beaufort Seer, April 1975.
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6.8.4.2 	 Problems Encountered in Exploratory
 
Drilling
 
The environmental problems associated with off­
shore activity in the Beaufort Sea are much different from
 
those on the east coast offshore and therefore require dif­
ferent information. The drilling season is so short that
 
offshore rigs will not likely move to other locations. This
 
is unlike the east coast rigs which go to the North Sea or
 
other locations when weather prohibits operations in Cana­
dian waters. The drilling costs may, therefore, be more
 
than three times those on the east coast because of stand­
by costs of up to nine months.
 
Different structures are required governed by plat­
form mobility requirements and cost considerations which,
 
in turn, are a function of water depth and re.lated ice con­
ditions.* Ice conditions such as movement and pressure
 
ridges become more important in deeper water.
 
In the Beaufort Sea the Arctic Pack usually re­
cedes during the summer (July to September) to a distance
 
of 80 to 150 miles offshore. (In Extreme conditions such
 
as 1974, this distance may be considerably smaller.) This
 
pack is made-up of multiyear ice which can reach a thick­
ness greater than 50 feet.** The nearshore areas are es­
sentially ice-free during the summer months but may be in­
vaded at any time by ice floes from the Arctic Ice Pack.
 
Strong winds with gusts up to 70 mph are common.
 
*R. Voelker and C. Schultz, Energy Communications, Inc.,
 
"The Battle Against Ice Begins," Offshore Technology
 
Yearbook, 1974.
 
**J.G. Riley, Energy Communications, Inc., "How Imperial
 
Built the First Arctic Island," Offshore Technology
 
Yearbook, 1974, p. 6.
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An indication of the difficulties associated with
 
offshore construction is given by considering the construc­
tion of the Immerk artificial island used as a base for
 
offshore drilling. The start of dredging operations was
 
restricted to July 15, 1972 because of concern for the
 
Beluga whale migration. Construction efforts were serious­
ly delayed by dense fog and invasion of the work area by
 
massive ice floes. Attempts to carry out dredging opera­
tions in adverse sea conditions resulted in considerable
 
damage to the dredge. "Of the 70 potential working days
 
from July 15 to September 22, actual placement of material
 
on the island occupied only 27 days."*
 
6.8.4.3 Remote Sensing Benefits
 
Two exploratory wells will be drilled in the Beau­
fort Sea in 1976. The original plan called for these rigs
 
to winter in the Arctic so that as long a drilling season
 
as ice conditions permit could be used. It is expected
 
that these wells will cost $25 million each and that the
 
daily operating cost will be $300,000 to $350,000 because
 
of the short (three month) working season (and lengthy
 
standby time). The large benefits of ice reconnaissance
 
are immediately apparent. A radar system will be on the
 
site, but aerial coverage will be needed to tell the extent
 
and nature of the encroaching ice. If a large floe of
 
*J.R. Riley, Energy Communications, Inc., "How Imperial
 
Built the First Arctic Island," Offshore Technology
 
Yearbook, 1974, p. 6.
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multiyear ice encroaches on the site, moving will be
 
required. in this region the Arctic pack advances and
 
retreats, and it is necessary to have a detailed daily sur­
veillance of its position, rate of movement, nature of pack,
 
etc., so that operations may be started as early as possi­
ble in the season and rigs can operate to close tolerances
 
to when to shut down or move. All-weather reconnaissance
as 

is required (helicopters may be frequently grounded by heavy
 
fog or storm conditions).
 
Estimates of the value of all-weather ice reconnaissance
 
and reliable 48-hour weather forecasting range up to two-weeks
 
saving in time per drilling season particularly in a year when
 
there is frequent movement of the ice. A saving of three to
 
four days per well in total is, therefore, considered conser­
vative. This could result in several ways. Twice daily micro­
wave ice reconnaissance at the beginning of the season could
 
result in an earlier start of one to two days. The favorable
 
conditions could otherwise be missed because of severe fog
 
grounding helicopters. As discussed earlier, daily surveillance
 
could avert unnecessary shutting down or moving off well com­
pletely. The ships to be used in 1976 are anchored. This means
 
that unnecessary moving off, returning and resetting anchors
 
would lose a minimum of two days in calm seas and could lose a
 
week or more if the sea was not calm enough to permit reposi­
tioning the marine riser.
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Surface wind information and reliable 48-hour weather
 
forecasts predicting winds that could drive ice away from or
 
toward fixed installations would have large benefits--in the
 
former case, giving confidence to continue operations and, in
 
the latter, possibly, preventing a disaster including damage
 
to a $50-80 million rig. Appropriate ice reconnaissance and
 
weather forecasting permitting an extension of the season by
 
only one to two days could result in completion of the well,
 
making unnecessary a return to that well the following year,
 
and a net timesaving of possibly one or two days. Resupply
 
operations both by ship and helicopter can be scheduled and
 
carried out more efficiently and safely with ice and wave
 
reconnaissance. A reliable 48-hour weather forecast would be
 
particularly beneficial for these operations. A three-to-four
 
day saving per well represents $0.9 - $1.2 million at an.
 
effective rate of $300,000 per day. This represents about 3.6
 
percent to 4.8 percent of the estimated well cost. Assuming
 
production estimates for oil of 500,000 billion barrels per day
 
by 1987 and 650,000 billion barrels per day by 1990, a reasonable
 
exploratory well drilling schedule would see the number of
 
wells per year increasing to about 18 by 1981 and decreasing
 
thereafter to four in 1990. Applying the above estimates
 
results in benefits reaching a maximum of $16.2-$21.6 million
 
in 1981 and decreasing thereafter to a value of about
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$3.6 to $4.8 million in 1990. (As before, these assume
 
appropriate remote sensing data acquisition systems,
 
communication systems and forecasting models in place.)
 
Operational SEASAT (or equivalent) data input into a suitable
 
information system could be expected to yield 50% of these
 
benefits by 1990.
 
6.8.4.4 Development and Production
 
Benefits of remote sensing in these latter phases
 
are uncertain until the nature of structures to be used is
 
decided upon. However, remote sensing data can provide some
 
of the information on ice characteristics such as movement and
 
pressure ridges which can help decide on optimum structures
 
to be used, both from an economic and environmental viewpoint.
 
It is probable that in shallower water a permanent
 
platform will be used to directionally drill eight to thirty
 
wells. In water up to 30', man-made islands will likely
 
continue to be used and from 30' to 120', cone shaped bottom
 
founded structures are probable. Seafloor pipelines may
 
then be laid to shore o'r to offshore tanker berths. In deeper
 
water, in part because of cost and pack ice pressures,
 
development drilling may be done from floating vessels which
 
move off under unfavorable conditions. Subsea completion
 
techniques will likely be used in deeper water areas.*
 
Reference 18.
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If development drilling is done from floating vessels,
 
the need for constant ice surveillance and weather and wave
 
information is critical for operations. If it is done from a
 
fixed platform, erection of that platform and movement of
 
equipment to the location are very sensitive to environmental
 
factors, and subsequent drilling becomes less sensitive. In
 
both cases, design criteria are strongly affected by historical
 
environmental data and several percentages of the capital cost
 
could be saved by good data to assist design. For development
 
drilling done from floating vessels, the same types of benefits
 
from ice and weather information apply as for exploratory
 
drilling. Because the time required for development drilling
 
is slightly less, and there is likely to be a greater
 
concentration of activity in the area, the benefits per well
 
from remote sensing ice surveillance and weather forecasting
 
are likely to be slightly less than in the exploratory phase.
 
A two-day overall saving is probable with- reduction of "false
 
alarms" and working to close tolerances in a hostile
 
environment, the major benefit.
 
Posbibly 50 percent of development drilling will be
 
done from fixed platforms, with at least eight directional
 
wells drilled from each. Assessing benefits from ice and
 
weather forecasting in this case is very difficult.
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The Battelle researchers -have considered potential 
benefits from SEASAT data by considering- a specific. case - that 
of a three-platform oil production operation in the North Sea.*
 
By examining the project log, they found that out of 26 days
 
that two derrick barges were committed to the task of lifting
 
the main production platform deck onto the legs, 11 days were
 
spent holding or towing due to weather conditions. They conclude
 
that 22/52 or 42.3 percent of derrick barge days could have been
 
saved by a reliable 48-hour sea state forecast provided using
 
operational SEASAT data. For this project, the benefits would
 
come from reducible labor charges and would amount to 22 operating
 
days at $25,000 per day or $550,000.
 
While benefits such as that listed above can be
 
expected to apply in the Beaufort Sea, the installation timing
 
of the platform is likely to be of much more importance in this
 
area. The platform supports the entire drilling and producting
 
operation and is, therefore, the most important single item.
 
The short open-water season means that timing is critical to
 
avoid waiting a full year for another installation period. An in­
dication of the importance of platform installation timing to the
 
entire project has been given by Culver for the Gulf of Mexico in
 
an area where current technology for platform design exists
 
and the conceptual design problems encountered in deep water areas,
 
, 
ECON, Inc., SEASAT Economic Assessment, October 1974,
 
p. 8-8.
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extreme weather areas, ice flow and iceberg areas do not apply.
 
"In order to continue safe operations in this hostile marine
 
environment and do so at a profit, factors that eventually will
 
shape the financial outcome of a project must be forecast as
 
accurately as possible--the most formidable factor to accurate
 
cost predictions in offshore work is. the natural elements of
 
the environment. The wind, waves and weather are adversities
 
that must be considered, Detailed time studies must be conducted
 
to insure that all facets of the platform installation work can
 
be accomplished during good weather which generally runs from
 
May through September. This is true despite the fact that this
 
is also the hurricane season. Often times, it is necessary to
 
pay a premium during the design or fabrication stage to acceler­
ate work so that platform installations will occur during favor­
able weather. Failure to take notice of or to make allowance
 
for this potential pitfall may result in the actual platform
 
installation cost being higher by 50 to 200 percent compared to
 
the original estimate."*
 
The same considerations apply in ice-infested waters
 
but with much more severe timing restrictions. In a bad ice
 
year when the ice retreats only for a short time or when it
 
advances and retreats several times, it may take every avail­
able day to complete the installation. Excellent ice and
 
weather forecasting become imperative. The operations of
 
* 
Energy Communications, Inc., "Forecasting Offshore
 
Platform Development Costs," Offshore Technology Yearbook,
 
1974, p. 182.
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mobilization and movement of the platform and support
 
equipment to the site and platform installation are all ice
 
and weather sensitive. An indication of the sensitivity of
 
the operation of platform deck installation in the example
 
given above for the North Sea is obtained by noting that
 
six of the 11 days spent waiting were days during which pipe
 
was laid. For the structures expected to be used in the
 
Beaufort Sea, encroaching ice will present the major problem.
 
In an area where fog frequently grounds helicopters, a rigid
 
schedule will likely have to be followed to transport the
 
bottom founded structure, right it into position and secure
 
it, install drilling rigs on top, bring in production equip­
ment, etc. A permanent platform will cost-more than $50
 
million. Installation costs of at least 10 percent can be
 
expected (The Science Council in cost estimates for an east
 
coast platform give installation costs at about one-third.*
 
Considering the Battelle study, experience in the Gulf of
 
Mexico, and the more critical timing conditions in the Arctic,
 
benefits from ice and weather forecasting ranging from $0.55
 
million (the value for the North Sea considered as a lower
 
limit) to several million in this area are probable. Once
 
development drilling from platforms commences, benefits of
 
ice and weather forecasting will be mainly to resupply
 
operations. Substantial losses (about $100,000) could be
 
A Case Study of East Coast Offshore Petroleum Explor­
ations," Science Council of Canada Background Study,
 
No. 30, p. 101.
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expected if a rig were to sit idle for a day waiting for
 
supply. A reliable 48-hour weather forecast would allow
 
proper scheduling of resupplies.
 
A scenario for development drilling giving oil
 
production of 0.5 million barrels per day by 1987 and
 
650,000 barrels per day by 1990 and gas production of 200
 
million cubic feet per day in 1987 and 2,800 million cubic
 
feet per day in 1990 would be 35 gas and oil wells drilled
 
in 1982 decreasing to 17 in 1990. Assuming 50 percent of
 
the wells are drilled from permanent platforms and the re­
mainder from drillships, approximately one platform would
 
be installed per year beginning in 1982 from which 17 wells
 
are drilled. The remaining 18 wells per year are drilled
 
from floating vessels with savings of two days each at
 
$200,000 per day or $7.2 million in 1982, and decreasing
 
after 1985 to $3.6 million in 1990. Remote sensing assisted
 
benefits to development drilling when platforms are used
 
are conservatively put at $0.55 to $1 million per year be­
ginning'in 1982. Input of SEASAT or equivalent microwave
 
sensor data into appropriate systems is again estimated at
 
50 percent or $2.6 million in 1990.
 
Pipelaying is one of the costliest items in bring­
ing an offshore oil field into production. Installation
 
costs are high and represent 75 percent of the total
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pipeline cost as an estimate.* In ice-infested areas
 
this percentage could be even higher.
 
The offshore pipeline laying phase will be ex­
tremely dependent on environmental conditions. Pipelines
 
are possible in the Beaufort Sea, (and may be necessary be­
cause of the pack ice) but there are two problems. The
 
pipe must be protected from scouring from ice islands which
 
ground on the bottom. This would involve dredging. Also,
 
the pipeline carrying hot oil may have to be insulated if
 
there are seabed permafrost areas. A possible pipelaying
 
spread would include a large barge, a burial barge, ten
 
supply boats and four to five work boats to push the ice
 
away.
 
Ice will present the most severe logistical pro­
blem for pipeline laying, but the rate at which it is laid
 
is also dependent on sea state. The pipelaying barge must
 
keep the pipe under tension to prevent buckling. If ice
 
encroaches and cannot be handled by ships designed to break
 
or push it away or if a severe storm is forecast, the pipe
 
would have to be tied off and lowered to the ocean floor
 
while maintaining tension. About one-third to one-half a
 
day is likely to be required for the lowering operation and
 
about one-half a day to resume operations when conditions
 
permit.
 
* 
Cazenove & Company, "The Search for Oil and Gas and
 
the Implications for Investment," London, 1972, p. 49.
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The Batelle studies have made benefit estimates
 
of SEASAT data in the pipeline-laying phase by considering
 
accident avoidance and avoidance of pipelaying barge costs
 
for one North Sea project.* They found that 11 out of 272
 
days or four percent lest due to weather related accidents
 
could have been saved by a reliable two-day weather fore­
cast. The accidents were to the stinger or pipe support
 
pontoon when the weather deteriorated so quickly that the
 
pipe could not be released and the stinger retrieved satis­
factorily. They found a saving of $87,500 per day or
 
$962,000 for 11 days.
 
They also found that of 272 working days for the
 
pipelaying barge, there were 64 or 23.5 percent for which
 
there would have been a labor charge saving based on a re­
liable 48-hour forecast. These were periods when crews were
 
kept holding waiting for weather to improve. A reliable
 
48-hour forecast would have saved 64- x 25,000 = $1.6 million.
 
The daily rate for barges, ancillary equipment
 
and crews for pipeline laying in the Beaufort Sea is likely
 
to be $200,000 or more per spread per day as compared with
 
$100,000 in the North Sea, because of the short working sea­
son and extensive equipment standby costs. It is difficult
 
to extrapolate from the North Sea to the Beaufort Sea because
 
ice replaces sea state as the main environmental problem.
 
Econ, Inc., SEASAT Economic Assessment, October 1974,
 
p. 8-8.
 
132
 
Remote sensing benefit estimates are highly speculative
 
because of lack of operating experience under such condi­
tions.
 
A value of three percent, more conservative than the
 
four percent given above, for weather related accidents is
 
likely to be appropriate in" this hostile environment and
 
would represent three days or about $600,000 in a 100-day
 
working season. Much of this would be due to wind driven
 
ice encroaching rapidly on the lay barge under fog or sudden
 
storm conditions. However, a further four percent or four-days
 
saving per season is probable from a variety of other benefit
 
aspects of improved ice reconnaissance and weather forecasting.
 
This includes reducing the number of false alarms and working
 
to closer tolerances within the environment, e.g. not dis­
connecting the pipe and lowering it to the ocean floor when
 
unnecessary. This procedure costs about one day in total
 
time plus the time spent waiting for a storm to materialize
 
or ice to move in which may be one to two days. It includes
 
working in dense fog and fairly heavy sea state if the crew
 
have the confidence that conditions will not deteriorate and
 
there are no ice hazards. An extra working day or more might
 
also be gained at the beginning or end of the season.
 
The potential time savings indicated above add up
 
to a total of one week out of 100 days (considered conserv­
ative by some who felt that ten days was possible). These
 
potential benefits total $1.4 million per spread per season.
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The problems associated with dredging in this
 
area have been clearly outlined in the description of the
 
Immerk Island construction.* The problems they experienced
 
with dense fog, ice floe invasion, strong winds and rough
 
seas and damage to the dredge leading to prolonged standby
 
periods (59 percent in September) can be expected to apply
 
in the weather sensitive pipeline-laying phase. The benefits
 
of $1.4 million per spread indicated above could be expected
 
to occur in one or two seasons. Companies would probably
 
gear up to complete a major line in a season if possible.
 
Again, timing could be a critical factor with good forecasting,
 
allowing a more efficient operation and higher probability of
 
completing a line in a given season without waiting a full
 
year. It is unlikely pipe can be laid off ice in winter par­
ticularly in the deeper water areas where it is continually
 
moving. (In one month in the winter of 1975 beyond the
 
60-foot water level, the ice moved 60 miles.) Forecasting
 
which helped in having a line completed in a given year
 
could free equipment to work elsewhere, possibly reducing
 
or eliminating standby costs of several thousand dollars
 
daily during winter. Also, benefits could result if produc­
tion were not delayed a year. Calculation of these benefits,
 
which could be millions of dollars depends on how the
 
J.R. Riley, "Energy Communication, Inc., "How Im­
perial Built the First Arctic Island," Offshore
 
Technology Yearbook, 1974, p. 6.
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petroleum production schedule was to be integrated into
 
the national supply schedule.
 
It is assumed that pipelaying activities are
 
carried out in two seasons for total calculable benefits
 
of $2.8 million. These benefits are very conservative in
 
view of considerations mentioned above.
 
6.8.5 Arctic Islands
 
Two offshore wells have been drilled during the
 
winter from reinforced ice platforms by Panarctic. In
 
1977 an offshore well is to be drilled from a dynamically
 
positioned drillship in Lancaster Sound in an area with
 
a 90 to 120-day open season. Pack ice and ice islands
 
present the main problems in the Arctic Islands, and good
 
ice reconnaissance similar to the requirements for the
 
Beaufort Sea is needed. (Some icebergs may also drift into
 
Lancaster Sound.)
 
Development drilling will require a platform that
 
can move off location under threat of heavy pack ice of ice
 
islands (also icebergs in the Lancaster Sound area). An
 
ice cutting semisubmersible is probable in the Arctic Island
 
areas. During ice breakup conditions, the pack can move
 
rapidly up to 30 miles per day. In spite of an ice cutting
 
capability, these vessels could not cope with the ice and
 
would have to move off.
 
Icebreakers or a rotary cutter may be used to chip
 
away at the pack ice. Clearly, design is critically depen­
dent on rate of ice movement and thickness and frequency
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of pressure ridges. For example, assuming an icebreaking
 
bow could be put on a rig, questions such as "Should it be
 
designed to cut pressure ridges greater than 50 feet in
 
thickness which may occur infrequently, or is it cheaper
 
to move off for infrequent events?", must be answered.*
 
Correct answers may be worth $10 million in construction
 
cost or several million dollars in lost drilling time.
 
(These vessels are expected to cost more than $100 million.
 
Increasing the power of the ice-cutting element to handle
 
worst possible ice thicknesses could cost up to $10 million.)
 
It is probable a sea floor central gathering system will be
 
used below the scour depth with storage onshore. Pipelaying
 
will be required.
 
Water depths can be considerable throughout the
 
Arctic Island Offshore areas and, for example, are about
 
2,000 to 2,500 feet in Lancaster Sound. Technology advances
 
must be made for the development and production stage.
 
A possible scenario for petroleum production is
 
250,000 barrels of oil per day by 1990 and 2,600 million
 
cubic feet of gas per day by 1990. Estimates of start of
 
oil production range from 1985 to 1990. The offshore drill­
ing activity could result in eight exploration wells per
 
year by 1981, decreasing to four by 1990 and 22 development
 
wells in 1985, decreasing to 11 in 1990. It is possible that
 
Oilweek, February 17, 1975, p. 76.
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about half of the wells (both exploratory and development)
 
will be drilled from ice platforms (as has been the case to
 
date) and half from offshore systems as described above.
 
Ice platforms would be used in shorefast ice areas, pro­
vided ice movement was very small.
 
The benefit areas considered for the Beaufort
 
to the Arctic Islands for those wells
Sea generally apply 

This can be expected to result
drilled in the moving ice. 

in savings of approximately three days or $900,000 in the
 
$400,000 in the develop­exploratory phase and two days or 

This would give
ment drilling phase for these wells. 

benefits for exploratory drilling of $3.6 million in 1981
 
and $1.8 million in 1990 and for development drillingof
 
$2.4 million in 1990. It is ex­
ice in winter in
 
$4.4 million in 1985 and 

pected that pipelines will be laid off 

most of these areas. Benefits of remote sensing data in
 
has been considered previously.*
these areas 

Although offshore drilling in the Islands has
 
con­thus far been limited, successes to date indicate that 

probable. Early in 1975,
siderable future activity is 

its Drake
Panarctic drilled a successful stepout well to 

Point gas field discovery from a reinforced ice platform.
 
A.K. McQuillan and D.J. Clough, "Benefit of Remote
 
Sensing of Sea ice," Research Report No. 73-3,
 
December, 1973.
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The Panarctic president has been quoted as saying, "There
 
is every indication the Drake Point field continues on and
 
on out to sea",* The proven reserves of this field (more
 
than five trillion cubic feet) make it the largest gas field
 
ever found in Canada.
 
6.8.6 Davis Strait - Baffin Bay
 
Environmental conditions for offshore oil pro­
duction in these areas have strong similarities to the
 
Labrador Sea. Icebergs are massive and numerous, pack-ice
 
problems exist, and heavy seas are common. Similar economic
 
benefit considerations as those in the Labrador Sea may be
 
applied.
 
Calculations similar to those in Section 6.2
 
yield benefits in the exploratory drilling phase of $5.4
 
million in 1981 decreasing to $2.1 million in 1990 and in
 
the development phase of $9.2 million in 1982 and $3.8
 
million in 1990.
 
6.8.7 Hudson Bay
 
Two wells were drilled in Hudson Bay in 1974 by
 
a Pentagone semisubmersible.** It is worth noting some of
 
the weather and ice related experiences of this stable rig
 
since it made history as the northernmost semisubmersible
 
"Panarctic Proves up Drake Point Reserves,"
 
Globe and Trail, May 8, 1975.
 
Pentagone Semisubmersible was Idea for Short,
 
Stormy Hudson Bay Season," Oilweek, December 16,
 
1974, p. 57.
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operating in the world. In spite of its stability, it
 
experienced delays due to "false alarms"--"Weather forecasts
 
were for worse conditions so drilling was stopped on the
 
Narwhal hole bMt it turned out that had not been necessary."
 
It is also sustained some ice damage--"at one point ice
 
floes began overtaking the rig from the rear and the,pon­
toon was dented over a two square meter area". The semi­
submersible lost a great amount of time in anchoring ­
enough to make the difference between three instead of two
 
holes drilled in the 1974 open water season.
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